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ABSTRACT
Fairness in the administration of the tax law is a subject of intense
debate in the United States. As myriad headlines reveal, the Internal
Revenue Service (“IRS”) has been accused of failing to enforce the tax law
equitably in its review of tax-exempt status applications by political
organizations, international tax structures of multinational corporations,
and estate tax returns of millionaires, among other areas. Many have
argued that greater “tax transparency” would better empower the public
to hold the IRS accountable and the IRS to defend itself against accusations
of malfeasance. Mandatory public disclosure of taxpayers’ tax return
information is often proposed as a way to achieve greater tax
transparency. Yet, in addition to concerns regarding exposure of personal
and proprietary information, broad public disclosure measures pose
potential threats to the taxing authority’s ability to enforce the tax law.
Given the competing values of accountability and enforcement, what
tax return information should be observable by the public? This Article
considers the role of timing. The IRS continually engages in enforcement
actions ex post—after taxpayers pursue transactions and claim tax
positions—such as by conducting audits or negotiating settlements. But it
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also frequently engages in actions ex ante—before taxpayers pursue
transactions and claim tax positions—by issuing advance tax rulings to,
and entering into agreements with, specific taxpayers. While current law
appears to require public disclosure of certain types of ex ante tax
administration, many forms of ex ante tax administration remain concealed
from public view. This Article argues that documents related to a specific
taxpayer’s tax affairs that reflect ex ante tax administration should be
publicly accessible as a means of accountability, but that documents that
reflect ex post tax actions should remain private in order to preserve
effective tax enforcement. Further, this Article proposes that the public
should have access not only to ex ante tax administration actions where the
taxing authority grants taxpayers’ requests, but also to those actions where
the taxing authority denies such requests, even if it does so without issuing
an official written determination, a concept it defines as “dual tax
transparency.”
The Article then applies this analysis to several types of ex ante tax
administration that are currently obscured by the curtain of tax privacy:
withdrawn private letter ruling requests, adverse tax-exempt determination
letters, and advance pricing agreements. It concludes by exploring
approaches to improving the accountability of the IRS regarding its ex post
tax enforcement other than public disclosure of tax return information.
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INTRODUCTION
Fairness in the administration of the tax law is a subject of intense
debate in the United States, as myriad headlines reveal. Recent
investigations that exposed the low, or in some cases, nonexistent taxation
of earnings achieved through international transfer pricing structures by
brand-name corporations such as Google,1 Apple,2 General Electric,3 and
Starbucks,4 among many others,5 have caused some critics to question why
the IRS either has failed to challenge these structures more vigorously or
has even offered them its blessings.6 Likewise, stories in the popular press
suggesting that the IRS reduced its audits of federal estate tax returns of
millionaires have generated concern that the agency has failed to enforce
1. See Jesse Drucker, Google 2.4% Rate Shows How $60 Billion Is Lost to Tax Loopholes,
BLOOMBERG (Oct. 21, 2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-10-21/google-2-4-rate-showshow-60-billion-u-s-revenue-lost-to-tax-loopholes.html.
2. See Memorandum from Carl Levin and John McCain, Senators, Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigations, to Members of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (May 21, 2013)
(regarding Offshore Profit Shifting and the U.S. Tax Code in relation to Apple, Inc.).
3. See David Kocieniewski, G.E.’s Strategies Let It Avoid Taxes Altogether, N.Y. TIMES (Mar.
24, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/25/business/economy/25tax.html.
4. See, e.g., Edward D. Kleinbard, Through a Latte, Darkly: Starbucks’s Stateless Income
Planning, 139 TAX NOTES 1515 (2013).
5. See, e.g., Jesse Drucker, U.S. Companies Dodge $60 Billion in Taxes Even Tea Party
Condemns, BLOOMBERG (May 13, 2010), https://thewere42.wordpress.com/2010/05/14/companiesdodge-60-billion-in-taxes-even-tea-party-condemns.
6. See, e.g., David Cay Johnston, Dell’s Multiple Restructurings Aid It in Tax Avoidance, 138
TAX NOTES 499 (2013); Edward D. Kleinbard, Stateless Income, 11 FLA. TAX. REV. 699, 708–09
(2011) (criticizing 2006 Advance Pricing Agreement between IRS and Google).
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the tax law against those with the greatest ability to pay.7 And irrespective
of whether an ongoing inquiry into the IRS’s review of political
organizations’ applications for tax-exempt status ultimately finds abuse of
discretion or worse,8 critics have nonetheless questioned the impartiality of
the agency.9 In response to these reports, many have argued that greater
“tax transparency” would better empower both the public to hold the IRS
accountable and the IRS to defend itself against accusations of
malfeasance.10
While often presented as a panacea for public discontent with the tax
7. See, e.g., David Cay Johnston, I.R.S. to Cut Tax Auditors, N.Y. TIMES (July 23, 2006),
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/23/business/23tax.html; Allen Kenney, IRS Plans Significant Cuts to
Estate Tax Program, TAX NOTES TODAY (July 24, 2006), http://www.taxnotes.com/tax-notestoday/estate-gift-and-inheritance-taxes/irs-plans-significant-cuts-estate-tax-program/2006/07/24/50467
56?
8. See TREAS. INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., INAPPROPRIATE CRITERIA WERE USED TO
IDENTIFY TAX-EXEMPT APPLICATIONS FOR REVIEW (2013), https://www.treasury.gov/tigta/
auditreports/2013reports/201310053fr.pdf.
9. See, e.g., Paul Caron, The IRS Scandal, Day 738, TAXPROFBLOG (May 17, 2015),
http://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/2015/05/the-irs--1.html; Fred Stokeld, IRS Sparks Outrage
with Admission It Mistreated Tea Party Groups, TAX NOTES TODAY (May 13, 2013),
http://www.taxnotes.com/tax-notes-today/exempt-organizations/irs-sparks-outrage-admission-itmistreated-tea-party-groups/2013/05/13/f319?; Marc A. Thiessen, How Obama’s IRS Scandal Harms
National Security, WASH. POST: OPINIONS (Aug. 5, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/
marc-thiessen-how-obamas-irs-scandal-harms-national-security/2013/08/05/9fea9616-fde1-11e2-96a8d3b921c0924a_story.html; Molly Wharton, Issa to IRS Commissioner: ‘You Have a Problem
Maintaining Credibility,’ NAT’L. REV.: THE CORNER (June 24, 2014), http://www.nationalreview.com/
corner/381078/issa-irs-commissioner-you-have-problem-maintaining-credibility-molly-wharton
(quoting Rep. Darrell Issa). But see STAFF OF S. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, COMM.
ON HOMELAND SEC. & GOV’T AFFAIRS, 113TH CONG., IRS AND TIGTA MANAGEMENT FAILURES
RELATED TO 501(C)(4) APPLICANTS ENGAGED IN CAMPAIGN ACTIVITY (Comm. Print 2014)
(concluding that IRS subjected both conservative and liberal groups to “delays, burdensome questions,
and mismanagement”). For scholarly discussion of the controversy, see Ellen P. Aprill, The Section 527
Obstacle to Effective Section 501(c)(4) Regulations, PITT. TAX REV. (forthcoming); George K. Yin,
Reforming (And Saving) the IRS By Respecting the Public’s Right to Know, 100 VA. L. REV. 1115,
1162–64 (2014).
10. See, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & Ariel Siman, The 1 Percent Solution: Corporate Tax
Returns Should Be Public (and How to Get There), TAX NOTES INT’L, Feb. 17, 2014, at 627; Yariv
Brauner, What the BEPS?, 16 FLA. TAX REV. 55, 106 (2014); Allison Christians, Do We Need to Know
More About Our Public Companies?, TAX NOTES INT’L, May 28, 2012, at 843; Lee A. Sheppard,
Should Corporate Tax Returns Be Disclosed?, 142 TAX NOTES 1381 (2014); Joseph J. Thorndike, Show
Us the Money, 123 TAX NOTES 148 (2009) [hereinafter Thorndike, Show Us the Money]; Joseph J.
Thorndike, The Thorndike Challenge, 122 TAX NOTES 691 (2009) [hereinafter Thorndike, The
Thorndike Challenge]; Yin, supra note 9, at 1162–64; Catherine Rampell, Shareholders, Public
Deserve Tax Transparency, WASH. POST (Aug. 21, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/
catherine-rampell-shareholders-public-deserve-tax-transparency/2014/08/21/f547d980-296d-11e48593-da634b334390_story.html.
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system, tax transparency—which can be defined broadly as the
government’s openness regarding its tax rules, agency interpretations,
decisionmaking processes, and enforcement practices—serves two distinct
purposes. Tax transparency is first and foremost an essential feature of
democratic governance, providing the public with knowledge of the tax
laws and policies, both as enacted and as applied, and facilitating informed
debate.11 In addition, tax transparency empowers the public to monitor the
taxing authority, the IRS, deterring the agency from pursuing misguided
policies or engaging in malfeasance or corruption.12
Mandatory public disclosure of taxpayers’ tax return information is
often proposed as a way to achieve greater tax transparency. Today, nearly
all tax returns are subject to extensive tax privacy protections that prohibit
the federal government from publicly releasing any taxpayer’s “returns” or
“return information.”13 In contrast, several scholars, including Joseph
Thorndike,14 Marjorie Kornhauser,15 Marc Linder,16 and Laurence
Kotlikoff,17 have advocated for public disclosure of some or all of
individual taxpayers’ annual tax returns in order to ensure that the IRS is
pursuing adequate investigations18 and is “free . . . from corrupting
influences.”19 Similarly, scholars such as Reuven Avi-Yonah,20 Allison
Christians,21 Richard Pomp,22 and John Braithwaite,23 among others,24 have
11. See infra notes 56–60 and accompanying text. See also JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE
14–15 (Harvard Univ. Press rev. ed. 1999); Mark Fenster, The Opacity of Transparency, 91 IOWA L.
REV. 885, 888–910 (2006); Frederick Schauer, Transparency in Three Dimensions, 2011 U. ILL. L.
REV. 1339, 1348–50.
12. See infra notes 61–64 and accompanying text. See also Fenster, supra note 11, at 888-910;
Schauer, supra note 11, at 1348-50; Lawrence B. Solum, Legal Theory Lexicon 015: Transparency,
LEGAL THEORY LEXICON (Mar. 6, 2016), http://lsolum.typepad.com/legal_theory_lexicon/2003/12/.
13. I.R.C. §§ 6103(a), (b) (2016).
14. See generally Thorndike, Show Us the Money, supra note 10; Thorndike, The Thorndike
Challenge, supra note 10 (arguing for public access to individuals’ tax returns).
15. Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Doing the Full Monty: Will Publicizing Tax Information Increase
Compliance?, 18 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 95, 113 (2005).
16. See generally Marc Linder, Tax Glasnost for Millionaires: Peeking Behind the Veil of
Ignorance Along the Publicity-Privacy Continuum, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 951 (1990–91).
17. See Anna Bernasek, Should Tax Bills Be Public Information?, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 13, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/14/business//yourtaxes/14disclose.html (quoting Professor Laurence
Kotlikoff). See also Stephen W. Mazza, Taxpayer Privacy and Tax Compliance, 51 U. KAN. L. REV.
1065, 1120–43 (2003); Paul Schwartz, The Future of Tax Privacy, 61 NAT’L TAX J. 883, 895–96
(2008).
18. See, e.g., Thorndike, Show Us the Money, supra note 10.
19. Kornhauser, supra note 15, at 98.
20. Avi-Yonah & Siman, supra note 10, at 627.
21. Christians, supra note 10, at 843.
22. See generally Richard D. Pomp, The Disclosure of State Corporate Income Tax Data:
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proposed that publicly traded corporations in the United States be required
to publicly disclose their annual tax returns in order to achieve “greater
accountability not only regarding the taxes paid by multinationals, but also
those demanded to be paid by governments.”25 Since the dawn of the
federal income tax in the United States, legislators and others have offered
similar proposals out of the concern that secrecy in tax administration gives
rise to “favoritism,”26 “collusion,”27 and “corruption.”28
Despite its potential to shine sunlight upon the taxing authority’s
actions, broad public disclosure measures pose several potential threats to
the taxing authority’s ability to enforce the tax law effectively.29 Without
tax privacy, individual taxpayers would observe salient examples of the
IRS’s tax enforcement weaknesses, which would likely result in shifts in
individuals’ perceptions of the agency’s strengths in detecting tax offenses
and punishing their perpetrators.30 Additionally, public disclosure of
complete tax returns, as opposed to more targeted measures, would
increase the ability of certain actors—shareholders, corporate managers,
and even individual taxpayers—to establish benchmarks of aggressiveness
in several tax compliance areas and pressure their agents, such as corporate
tax directors or personal tax advisors, to pursue more aggressive strategies
to keep pace with the tax planning of others.31 And public disclosure of
certain tax return information would enhance the ability of advisors and
Turning the Clock Back to the Future, 22 CAP. U. L. REV. 373 (1993).
23. JOHN BRAITHWAITE, MARKETS IN VICE, MARKETS IN VIRTUE 161 (2005).
24. See, e.g., Bruce Bartlett, Can Publicity Curb Corporate Tax Avoidance?, FIN. TIMES: THE ALIST (Jan. 31, 2013), http://blogs.ft.com/the-a-list/2013/01/31/can-publicity-curb-corporate-taxavoidance; Editorial Bd., On Corporate Taxes, Put the Public in Publicly Traded: View, BLOOMBERG:
BLOOMBERGVIEW (Oct. 5, 2011), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2011-10-06/on-corporatetaxes-put-the-public-in-publicly-traded-view; Felix Salmon, Why Public Companies Should Have
Public Tax Returns, REUTERS (Feb. 18, 2014), http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2013/05/21/whypublic-companies-should-have-public-tax-returns/.
25. Christians, supra note 10, at 843.
26. S. REP. NO. 68-398, at 12 (1924) (criticizing secrecy of tax appeals decisions).
27. HARRY EDWIN SMITH, THE UNITED STATES FEDERAL INTERNAL TAX HISTORY FROM 1861
TO 1871, at 67 (1914).
28. Bernasek, supra note 17 (quoting Sen. Robert Howell).
29. Joshua D. Blank, In Defense of Individual Tax Privacy, 61 EMORY L.J. 265, 292 (2011)
[hereinafter Blank, Individual Tax Privacy]; Joshua D. Blank, Reconsidering Corporate Tax Privacy,
11 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 31, 72–73 (2014) [hereinafter Blank, Corporate Tax Privacy]; Joshua D. Blank,
USA, in TAX SECRECY AND TAX TRANSPARENCY: THE RELEVANCE OF CONFIDENTIALITY IN TAX LAW
1163, 1177 (Eleonor Kristoffersson et al. eds., 2013) [hereinafter Blank, USA].
30. See Blank, Individual Tax Privacy, supra note 29, at 287–26.
31. See Blank, Corporate Tax Privacy, supra note 29, at 62–69.
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other third parties to reverse engineer the IRS’s detection strategies,
impairing its deterrence and enforcement efforts.32
Given the competing values of accountability and enforcement, what
types of tax return information should be observable by the public? This
Article considers the role of timing. The IRS continually engages in
enforcement actions ex post—after taxpayers pursue transactions and claim
tax positions—such as by conducting audits or negotiating settlements.33
But it also frequently engages in actions ex ante—before taxpayers pursue
transactions and claim tax positions—by issuing advance tax rulings to and
entering advance agreements with specific taxpayers.34 While current law
appears to require public disclosure of certain types of ex ante tax
administration, many forms of ex ante tax administration remain concealed
from public view. This Article argues that documents related to a specific
taxpayer’s tax affairs that reflect ex ante tax administration should be
publicly accessible as a means of accountability, but that documents that
reflect ex post tax actions should remain private in order to preserve
effective tax enforcement. Further, this Article proposes that the public
should have access not only to ex ante tax administration actions where the
taxing authority grants taxpayers’ requests, but also to those actions where
the taxing authority denies such requests, even if it does so without issuing
an official written determination, a concept it defines as “dual tax
transparency.”
Ex ante tax administration, which largely occurs in the form of
advance tax rulings issued by the taxing authority, should be publicly
accessible for three reasons.
First, non-disclosure of ex ante tax administration presents greater
risks to the sociological legitimacy of the IRS—the public’s perception of
the actions of the IRS as justified and appropriate—than non-disclosure of
ex post tax enforcement.35 Without access to advance tax rulings, the risk
of public perceptions that the IRS creates secret tax law when issuing
advance tax rulings increases. As a result of its greater bargaining power
when considering requests for advance tax rulings, the IRS often has more
freedom to express its own interpretation of the tax law in this setting.36

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

See id. at 69–73.
See infra notes 136–148 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 149–157 and accompanying text.
See infra Part II.C.1.
See infra notes 218–229 and accompanying text.
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These rulings reflect the IRS’s interpretation of the tax law, whereas ex
post tax enforcement decisions often involve other factors, such as the
administrative costs of pursuing litigation. Moreover, taxpayers have an
interest in determining whether the IRS is issuing advance tax rulings on
equitable terms to like-situated taxpayers. And given the enormous
financial stakes involved, often billions of dollars in potential tax liability,37
and the IRS’s ex ante bargaining position, advance tax rulings pose unique
threats to the integrity of the IRS, whether perceived or actual.
Second, public disclosure of ex ante tax administration can promote
efficient financial transactions, whereas public disclosure of ex post tax
enforcement is more likely to result in wasteful aggressive tax planning.38
Public disclosure of these rulings would provide taxpayers with greater
understanding of the IRS’s interpretation of the tax law, potentially
preventing transactions or other actions designed to avoid the risk of audit
or challenge. Public disclosure of advance tax rulings can also promote
efficiency by guiding taxpayers regarding whether they should seek such
rulings from the IRS themselves. By contrast, public disclosure of tax
return information can encourage increased tax aggressiveness by enabling
taxpayers and third parties to conduct reviews of the IRS’s ex post audit,
settlement, and penalty techniques.
Finally, compared to public disclosure of ex post tax administration,
public disclosure of ex ante tax administration does not threaten the IRS’s
ability to enforce the tax law.39 There is little risk that public disclosure of
ex ante tax administration would adversely affect individual taxpayers’
perceptions of the government’s tax enforcement strengths, as the IRS
retains discretion to issue advance tax rulings.40 It is also unlikely that
public disclosure of ex ante tax administration would result in the
development of benchmarks of tax aggressiveness, which could result from
public disclosure of ex post tax enforcement. Last, public disclosure of ex
ante tax administration would offer taxpayers guidance regarding the
factors the IRS views as necessary in order to issue advance tax rulings, but

37. See, e.g., Amy S. Elliott, The New Limits on Corporate Letter Rulings Explained, 134 TAX
NOTES 622 (2012); Audrey Nutt, Glaxo, IRS Settle Transfer Pricing Dispute for $3.4 Billion, TAX
NOTES TODAY (Sept. 12, 2006), http://www.taxnotes.com/news-documents/transfer-pricing-andapportionment-issues/glaxo-us-irs-settle-transfer-pricing-dispute-us-34-billion/2006/09/12/jmsy?.
38. See infra Part II.C.2.
39. See infra Part II.C.3.
40. See infra notes 256–264 and accompanying text.
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it would not enable taxpayers to reverse engineer the agency’s approaches
to detecting abusive tax positions.
Even though the IRS is required to publicly disclose “written
determination[s]”41 issued in response to taxpayers’ requests for advance
tax rulings, agreements, and approvals, current law prevents the public
from observing many forms of ex ante tax administration.42 When the IRS
publishes advance tax rulings today, it almost always discloses rulings
where the agency granted taxpayers’ requests.43 If they anticipate adverse
rulings, taxpayers can withdraw their ruling requests, obviating the need for
a written determination by the IRS.44 And certain types of ex ante tax
administration are not publicly accessible in any form.45 As a baseline for
public disclosure, “dual tax transparency” would enable the public to
observe specific instances where the IRS grants and denies taxpayers’
requests for advance tax rulings or agreements. This Article applies this
analysis to several types of ex ante tax administration that are currently
obscured by the curtain of tax privacy: withdrawn private letter ruling
requests, adverse tax-exempt determination letters, and Advance Pricing
Agreements.46
While this Article advocates for public disclosure of ex ante tax
administration, it does not suggest that the IRS should be unaccountable
when it pursues ex post tax enforcement. Rather than proposing mandatory
tax return public disclosure, the Article explores several alternative
approaches to improving the accountability of the IRS regarding its ex post
tax enforcement.47 These possibilities include changes to oversight,
whistleblower, and data access rules and processes.
The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows. Part I presents tax
transparency as a way for the public to hold the taxing authority
accountable for its actions, considers recent calls for public disclosure of
tax return information as a means of accountability, and outlines several of
the questionable assumptions underlying these proposals. Part II argues that
the timing of the taxing authority’s actions should play a role in the
determination of whether tax return information is publicly accessible,
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

I.R.C. § 6110(a) (2016).
See infra Part III.
See infra notes 318–319 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 320–334 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 372–407 and accompanying text.
See infra Part III.B.
See infra Part III.C.
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offers the case against public disclosure of ex post tax enforcement and for
public disclosure of ex ante tax administration, and considers the crossjurisdictional application of this analysis, using Sweden as a comparative
example. Part III introduces dual tax transparency, applies it to several
examples of ex ante tax administration, and offers approaches for
preserving accountability regarding ex post tax enforcement. The final Part
concludes.
I. TAX TRANSPARENCY AS ACCOUNTABILITY
Transparency is frequently extolled as an essential element of
democracy.48 Without it, philosophers and legal scholars caution, the
governed would possess little opportunity to hold the government
accountable for its decisions and actions.49 In the context of tax
administration, scholars, politicians, and popular commentators in the
United States have long argued that the taxing authority, the IRS, should
strive to conduct its affairs as transparently as possible.50 This Part presents
the rationale for transparency by the government, including in the
administration of the tax system, describes calls for public disclosure of
individual and business tax return information as a form of tax
transparency, and highlights several questionable assumptions underlying
arguments of public disclosure proponents.
A. WHY TRANSPARENCY?
While there is no universal definition of transparency in democratic
governance, philosophers and legal scholars have often described it as
“publicness of [the] public business,”51 where the government makes the
information it holds “available for examination and scrutiny.”52 Likewise,
tax scholars who advocate increased transparency in tax administration
describe the need for “openness,”53 “accountability,”54 and “sunshine.”55 A
48. See, e.g., Schauer, supra note 11, at 1348–50; Jeremy Waldron, Accountability: Fundamental
to Democracy 11 (N.Y.U. Sch. of Law Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Working
Paper No. 14-13, 2014), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2410812.
49. See, e.g., Jacob E. Gersen & Matthew C. Stephenson, Over-Accountability, 6 J. LEGAL
ANALYSIS 185, 186 (2014).
50. See infra notes 79–115 and accompanying text.
51. Waldron, supra note 48, at 11.
52. Schauer, supra note 11, at 1343.
53. Yin, supra note 9, at 1161 n.196.
54. Christians, supra note 10, at 843.
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broad definition of “tax transparency,” accordingly, is that it is the
government’s openness regarding its tax rules, agency interpretations,
decisionmaking processes, and enforcement practices. Transparency
generally serves two functions, which apply equally in the context of tax
administration: democratic governance and accountability.
Democratic Governance. Transparency is often described as
fundamental to democracy itself because the public’s knowledge of the
government’s policies and practices establishes that the people possess
power over the government.56 As Fred Schauer has stated, transparency
permits “public control not for the purpose of facilitating better decisions,
but instead as the embodiment of public control as an end in itself.”57 With
this control, members of the public can participate in debate and
deliberation regarding the government’s rules and actions based on actual
knowledge rather than speculation. Legal philosophers have characterized a
government that acts transparently as allowing its citizens “to meaningfully
participate in democratic self-government”58 by encouraging the
development of an “interested”59 rather than “suspicious”60 public.
Transparency, thus, is a core democratic value because it establishes the
people’s position with respect to the government and allows the people to
engage in informed debate that may affect the government’s laws and
implementation of these laws.
Accountability. An equally important function of transparency is that
it allows the public “to monitor government activity and hold officials,
particularly incompetent and corrupt ones, accountable for their actions.”61
This characterization of transparency predicts that without secrecy, the
government will be less likely to engage in bribery, rent-seeking,
regulatory capture, and “other forms of governmental misbehavior.”62 Even
when the government adopts policies that may not be readily visible to the
public, philosophers such as Immanuel Kant,63 and later John Rawls,64

55. Avi-Yonah & Siman, supra note 10, at 627.
56. See, e.g., Fenster, supra note 11, at 888; Schauer, supra note 11, at 1347; Waldron, supra
note 48, at 11; Solum, supra note 12.
57. Schauer, supra note 11, at 1349.
58. Solum, supra note 12.
59. Fenster, supra note 11, at 898.
60. See id.
61. Id. at 899.
62. Schauer, supra note 11, at 1349.
63. IMMANUEL KANT, ETERNAL PEACE (1795), reprinted in THE PHILOSOPHY OF KANT 430, 470
(Carl J. Friedrich ed. & trans., 1949).
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have added that it should assume hypothetical transparency by pursuing
only those policies that it could defend if they were ever exposed publicly.
Transparency, consequently, is necessary for the public to ensure
accountability of the government for its decisions and actions.
Principal-Agent Relationship. In considering the role of transparency
in democratic states, philosopher Jeremy Waldron has recently advocated
for the adoption of what he describes as “agent-accountability,” which casts
the government as an agent of the public, its principal.65 The concept of
accountability under this model describes duties that the agent generally
owes to its principal. As an example, Waldron describes a realtor and a
client as engaged in an analogous relationship to the government and the
public, as the realtor “makes certain arrangements for the purchase of a
house on [his client’s] behalf”66 and “may even have a power of attorney to
act in [his client’s] name.”67 Agent accountability casts the government as
accountable to the public rather than to a formal tribunal, which may not
investigate many of the government’s actions.
The primary implication of the agent accountability model is that the
government should provide information demanded by the public regarding
activities conducted on its behalf. The model requires the government to
provide sufficient information to the public in order to allow it to question
the government’s methodology, request changes to its practices, and even
terminate the service of legislators and regulators through elections.68
Describing the requirement of disclosure, Waldron contends that if the
government refuses to meet the public’s demand for an account regarding
its activities, the government’s refusal is “simple insolence.”69
Limits. Despite the view that transparency is crucial for accountability,
many philosophers and legal theorists believe that disclosure policies
should seek to limit adverse impact on the government’s ability to fulfill its
obligations.70 Some have argued that disclosure requirements should seek
64. JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 66 (1993).
65. Waldron, supra note 48, at 2.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 27.
70. See, e.g., Nathan Alexander Sales, Secrecy and National Security Investigations, 58 ALA. L.
REV. 811, 884 (2007); Schauer, supra note 11, at 1345 (discussing need “to recognize varying degrees
of transparency”); William J. Stuntz, Secret Service: Against Privacy and Transparency, NEW
REPUBLIC, Apr. 17, 2006, at 12.

2017]

THE TIMING OF TAX TRANSPARENCY

461

to balance the benefits to the public against the costs to the government’s
operational decisions.71 For example, few would argue that the government
should be required to provide the public with a description of a planned
surprise raid of a terrorist compound in advance of the enforcement action.
In such cases, proponents of transparency argue that the government should
provide the public with a concrete explanation for its decision to withhold
information.72 Others, such as William Stuntz, have argued that the
government would operate more efficiently if it were required to provide
the public with “bottom lines”73 regarding its activities, as opposed to
detailed accounts. Debates over the optimal level of transparency by the
government reveal that there are circumstances where even public
disclosure proponents do not believe the government should be required to
release information to the public.
B. TAX RETURNS IN THE PUBLIC EYE
Tax scholars, politicians, and popular commentators have argued that
mandatory public disclosure of tax return information would introduce
needed tax transparency in the United States, especially in light of recurrent
concerns regarding fair treatment of taxpayers by both the taxing authority
and the tax law itself. This Section examines current U.S. tax privacy rules
and recent public disclosure proposals regarding individual and corporate
tax return information.
Tax Privacy Today. Since the enactment of the Tax Reform Act of
1976,74 which responded to many abuses of the Nixon Administration, the
tax law provides that taxpayers’ “returns” and “return information” are
confidential, unless a specific statutory exception applies.75 Under Section
6103 of the Internal Revenue Code, “return information” is broadly defined
to include “any tax or information return”; any amendments filed with the
IRS; and any taxpayer’s identity, income, tax deductions and credits, or
audit and penalty history, among many other items.76 The statutory
framework contains several exceptions related to tax administration and
enforcement, such as provisions that allow sharing of information about

71. See, e.g., Fenster, supra note 11, at 936–37.
72. See Waldron, supra note 48, at 7.
73. Stuntz, supra note 70, at 15.
74. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520.
75. I.R.C. § 6103(a) (2016). It is not possible to request tax return information regarding a
particular taxpayer under the Freedom of Information Act. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (2016).
76. I.R.C. § 6103(b)(1) (2016).
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specific taxpayers between federal and state taxing authorities.77 These
exceptions aside, the sweeping protections of tax privacy under current law
prevent the public from observing nearly all tax return information and
extend equally to individuals and corporations.78
Public Disclosure of Individual Tax Returns. In contrast to the opacity
of current law, tax scholars and others have proposed, in varying degrees,
to lift the curtain of tax privacy that obscures individual tax returns from
public view. Some scholars, such as Joseph Thorndike79 and Laurence
Kotlikoff,80 and popular commentators81 have argued that individuals’ tax
returns should be fully accessible by the public. Others, such as Marjorie
Kornhauser, have suggested that only a portion of individual tax return
information should be publicly accessible, such as an individual’s name,
income, capital gains, exclusions, deductions and credits, and marginal and
effective tax rates.82 Finally, some have proposed targeted mandatory
public disclosure of individual tax returns that would apply to certain types
of taxpayers, such as individuals who earn more than $1 million per year,83
members of Congress,84 and candidates for certain public offices.85
Opponents have argued that mandatory public disclosure would infringe
upon taxpayers’ right to tax privacy, confuse the public with information
overload rather than enhanced understanding, and expose sensitive personal
information.86 In response, proponents contend that sunlight would aid the
IRS in its search for abusive tax positions,87 subject aggressive and
noncompliant taxpayers to public shaming,88 and educate the public
regarding the tax law.89

77. I.R.C. §§ 6103(c)–(o) (2016).
78. I.R.C. § 6103(a) (2016).
79. Thorndike, Show Us the Money, supra note 10.
80. See Bernasek, supra note 17 (quoting Professor Laurence Kotlikoff).
81. See, e.g., Andy Rooney, 60 Minutes: Andy’s Tip for the IRS (CBS television broadcast Apr.
19, 2009), http://www.cbsnews.com/video/watch/?id=4955238n.
82. Kornhauser, supra note 15, at 115–16.
83. Linder, supra note 16, at 976–77.
84. See, e.g., Thorndike, The Thorndike Challenge, supra note 10, at 691.
85. See id.
86. For a summary of these arguments, see Blank, Individual Tax Privacy, supra note 29, at 280–
82.
87. See, e.g., Thorndike, Show Us the Money, supra note 10.
88. See, e.g., Kornhauser, supra note 15, at 104; Jay A. Soled & Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., A Little
Shame Might Just Deter Tax Cheaters, USA TODAY, Apr. 10, 2008, at 11A.
89. See, e.g., Kornhauser, supra note 15, at 106.
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Significantly, proponents also argue that, if adopted, these measures
would enable the public to better hold the IRS accountable and even seek
reforms that would improve its ability to administer the tax law fairly.
Joseph Thorndike, for example, has asserted that public disclosure would
“reveal[] the actual, rather than the theoretical, functioning of the tax
system”90 and would allow the public to effectively double-check the work
of the IRS because it would cast “[m]illions of eyes on a tax return.”91
Thorndike has argued that current tax privacy rules “make the IRS
politically vulnerable, contributing to its popular image as an overpowerful,
unaccountable federal agency.”92 Likewise, Marjorie Kornhauser has
commented that public disclosure would show whether the administration
of the tax system is “free from the corrupting influences of powerful,
wealthy, and/or just simply venal individuals or groups.”93 And some
scholars, such as Laurence Kotlikoff, have argued that by revealing “how
terrible the system is,”94 mandatory public disclosure could lead to tax
administration reforms. A common theme throughout these recent
proposals is that public disclosure of individual tax return information
would embolden the ability of the public to monitor the actions of the IRS,
or lack thereof, against specific individual taxpayers.
Similar accountability objectives underscore many of the individual
tax return public disclosure measures that have been adopted since the
dawn of the federal income tax in the United States. For example, soon
after enacting the Civil War Income Tax of 1862, Congress required the
Commissioner to permit public inspection of complete tax returns and the
“proceedings of the assessors.”95 Journalists at The New York Times
systematically analyzed the enforcement efforts of specific collection
districts. For instance, in criticizing the underperforming “Sixth Collection
District” in New York City in 1865, the paper’s reporters accused the
office’s chief tax collector of lacking “brain with which to comprehend the
mysteries of the law and physique with which to drive work and workmen
to secure results.”96 When Congress later enacted legislation that required

90. Thorndike, Show Us the Money, supra note 10.
91. Thorndike, The Thorndike Challenge, supra note 10, at 691.
92. Joseph J. Thorndike, The IRS Is Hiding Its History, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 19, 1997, at A23.
93. Kornhauser, supra note 15, at 98.
94. Bernasek, supra note 17 (quoting Professor Laurence J. Kotlikoff).
95. Act of June 30, 1864, ch. 173, § 19, 13 Stat. 223, 228.
96. Our Internal Revenue: The Sixth Collection District in Full, N.Y. TIMES (July 8, 1865),
http://www.nytimes.com/1865/07/08/news/our-internal-revenue-sixth-collection-district-full-officiallists-assessments.html.
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public disclosure of all individuals’ income tax payments, proponents
argued that the legislation would prevent tax privacy from serving as “the
greatest aid to corruption”97 between taxpayers and the IRS. Likewise, in
1934, when Congress passed legislation that would have required all
individuals to publicly disclose certain tax information on an annual “pink
slip,” proponents asserted that it would enable the public to monitor
whether the IRS offered “special privileges”98 and “gross favoritism”99 to
wealthy taxpayers.
Public Disclosure of Corporate Tax Returns. Similarly, a number of
tax scholars and policymakers have argued that publicly traded U.S.
corporations should be required to publicly disclose certain tax return
information, especially in light of accounts that brand-name U.S.
multinational corporations have reported single-digit tax rates,100
participated in abusive tax shelters,101 and pursued complex international
transfer pricing structures that reduce or even eliminate tax liability.102 The
most common proposal, offered by tax scholars such as Reuven AviYonah,103 Richard Pomp,104 John Braithwaite,105 Joseph Thorndike,106
Allison Christians,107 and others,108 would require corporations to publish
their complete tax returns each year. Complete corporate tax returns of a
multinational corporation include IRS Form 1120, an annual return setting
forth a multinational corporation’s gross income, deductions, taxable
income, and taxes owed, but also dozens of attached forms, schedules, and
explanatory documents that may, in total, amount to tens of thousands of
pages.109 Proponents of public disclosure of corporate tax return
97. MARK H. LEFF, THE LIMITS OF SYMBOLIC REFORM: THE NEW DEAL AND TAXATION, 1933–
1939, at 67 (1984).
98. 78 CONG. REC. 6529, 6546 (1934) (statement of Sen. La Follette).
99. Id. As some scholars have noted, little evidence was presented to corroborate these
accusations. See Yin, supra note 9, at 1129 n.45.
100. See, e.g., Kocieniewski, supra note 3.
101. See DEP’T OF TREASURY, THE PROBLEM OF CORPORATE TAX SHELTERS: DISCUSSION,
ANALYSIS AND LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS 30 (1999), https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/taxpolicy/Documents/Report-Corporate-Tax-Shelters-1999.pdf.
102. See, e.g., Drucker, supra note 1.
103. See Avi-Yonah & Siman, supra note 10, at 627.
104. See Pomp, supra note 22, at 463.
105. See BRAITHWAITE, supra note 23, at 202.
106. See Thorndike, Show Us the Money, supra note 10.
107. See Christians, supra note 10, at 843.
108. See Brauner, supra note 10, at 106; Rampell, supra note 10; Sheppard, supra note 10.
109. See John McCormack, GE Filed 57,000-Page Tax Return, Paid No Taxes on $14 Billion in
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information argue that it would lead to public scrutiny of the IRS’s dealings
with corporations.110 Other tax scholars have argued in favor of more
limited public disclosure of corporate tax return information.111 In prior
work, for example, I have advocated for mandatory public disclosure of
public corporations’ single-page IRS Form 1120 (without any attachments),
IRS Schedule M-3, and a corporate “pink slip” (which would contain only
certain tax information).112
The public monitoring goals underlying recent public disclosure
proposals are nearly identical to the stated rationales for historic measures
that required corporations to publicly disclose their tax returns. When
Congress first enacted the Corporate Excise Tax of 1909, it provided that
corporate tax returns “shall constitute public records and be open to
inspection as such.”113 While mandatory corporate tax return public
disclosure was short-lived, one of its goals was to “encourage honesty”114
by both corporations and the tax administration. Similarly, during the 1934
debates over the pink slip measure, which would have required
corporations to publicly disclose certain tax return information, advocates
argued that the measure would prevent “maladministration of the tax
law.”115
C. QUESTIONABLE ASSUMPTIONS
Proponents of broad tax transparency measures, such as mandatory
public disclosure of complete tax return information,116 have asserted that

Profits, WKLY. STANDARD (Nov. 17, 2011), http://www.weeklystandard.com/ge-filed-57000-page-taxreturn-paid-no-taxes-on-14-billion-in-profits/article/609137.
110. See, e.g., BRAITHWAITE, supra note 23, at 155; Avi-Yonah & Siman, supra note 10, at 627.
111. See, e.g., Peter C. Canellos & Edward D. Kleinbard, IRS Should Release Schedules M-3, Not
Entire Corporate Tax Returns, 110 TAX NOTES 1485, 1485 (2006) (advocating for public release of IRS
Schedule M-3 only); David Lenter, Joel Slemrod & Douglas Shackelford, Public Disclosure of
Corporate Tax Return Information: Accounting, Economics, and Legal Perspectives, 56 NAT’L TAX J.
803, 827 (2003) (advocating for limited public disclosure); Daniel N. Shaviro, The Optimal
Relationship Between Taxable Income and Financial Accounting Income: Analysis and a Proposal, 97
GEO. L.J. 423, 427 n.11 (2009) (advocating for public release of IRS Schedule M-3).
112. Blank, Corporate Tax Privacy, supra note 29, at 109–20.
113. Tariff Act of Aug. 5, 1909, ch. 6, § 38, 36 Stat. 11, 112 (repealed).
114. Joe Thorndike, Tax History: Promoting Honesty by Releasing Corporate Tax Returns,
INSURANCE TAX REV.: TAX HISTORY (Aug. 1, 2002).
115. 79 CONG. REC. 4413, 4445 (1935) (quoting Sen. La Follette), discussed in Marjorie E.
Kornhauser, Shaping Public Opinion and the Law: How a “Common Man” Campaign Ended a Rich
Man’s Law, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 123, 129–30 (2010).
116. See, e.g., Avi-Yonah & Siman, supra note 10, at 627; Bruce Bartlett, Effective Corporate Tax
Rates, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 26, 2013), https://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/11/26/effective-
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their proposals would enhance the ability of the public to hold the IRS
accountable for its actions and, if necessary, seek reforms that would result
in more equitable and effective tax administration. The claim that such
public disclosure would lead to accountability and reformed tax
administration, however, rests on several questionable assumptions.
First, proponents of broad public disclosure of tax return information
discount the potential for legislators and others to exploit specific examples
of IRS shortcomings for political purposes, rather than to engage in
objective review of tax administration. Public disclosure of complete tax
return information would enable interested parties, including members of
Congress, to highlight specific tax enforcement examples as signs of IRS
abuse even though they are not representative of general IRS practices. For
example, during the 1998 U.S. Senate Finance Committee hearings that
reviewed the IRS’s enforcement operations,117 committee members and the
public heard over a dozen “horror stories”118 from sympathetic taxpayers
who claimed abusive treatment by the IRS, including a pastor,119 single
mother,120 and even a former U.S. Senator.121 Subsequent investigations
revealed that several of these accounts were greatly exaggerated and not
indicative of general malfeasance.122 Public disclosure of all tax return
information could lead politicians to seize on any IRS enforcement action
against politically involved taxpayers, whether members of Congress or
corporations that have made political contributions, as an example of
enforcement bias.123
Second, some proponents of public disclosure assume that releasing
tax return information could motivate Congress to respond to revealed
enforcement failures by seeking reforms that would bolster the IRS’s
enforcement capabilities. For instance, Congress could respond to the

corporate-tax-rates/; Rampell, supra note 10; Salmon, supra note 24; Thorndike, Show Us the Money,
supra note 10.
117. IRS Oversight: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 105th Cong. (1998).
118. Id. at 45 (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch, Member, S. Comm. on Fin.).
119. Id. at 293–97 (statement of Tony Alamo, Pastor, International Coalition for Religious
Freedom).
120. Id. at 298 (statement of the National Audit Defense Network).
121. Id. at 182–85 (statement of Hon. Howard H. Baker, Jr., former U.S. Sen., Tenn.).
122. DAVID CAY JOHNSTON, PERFECTLY LEGAL 145–48 (2003).
123. See, e.g., Christine O’Donnell, Christine O’Donnell: I Was a Victim of the IRS, N.Y. POST
(Feb. 22, 2014), http://nypost.com/2014/02/22/christine-odonnell-i-was-a-victim-of-the-irs (describing
personal experience with IRS).
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revelation that the IRS has failed to audit certain wealthy individuals or
corporations by increasing its enforcement funding. If past experience is
any guide, however, the revelation that the IRS has failed to enforce the
law effectively is just as likely, if not more likely, to result in a blunt
response of reduced budgetary resources.124 For example, in response to a
2015 report that the IRS website allowed computer hackers to gain access
to 100,000 taxpayers’ tax returns and use this information to request
fraudulent refunds,125 members of Congress responded by proposing
legislation that would impose what critics described as “draconian” cuts to
the IRS’s operating needs, including those related to its cybersecurity
efforts.126 Likewise, following publicity of allegations of political bias by
the IRS in the tax-exempt application review process,127 members of
Congress voted to reduce the IRS’s overall budget as a response to the
IRS’s “recent history of inappropriate behavior.”128 Even if public
disclosure of tax return information leads to an increased public focus on
the IRS, the result would likely be reduced enforcement resources rather
than targeted reform.
Third, proponents assume that mandatory public disclosure would
enable the public to double-check the IRS’s detection of tax avoidance and
evasion, especially involving wealthy taxpayers and corporations, and to
offer recommendations regarding its audit practices. For instance, Joseph
Thorndike has argued that with public access to tax return information,
external institutions and parties, including “plenty of expert ones,” would
“certainly uncover any problems in short order.”129 While the IRS may
make a deliberate decision not to pursue certain known cases of tax
avoidance as a result of resource constraints or the hazards of litigation, in
many cases of unknown tax avoidance, the most valuable information to
the IRS rests with the taxpayer and closely-related parties. For this reason,
the IRS pays valuable rewards to informants and whistleblowers who

124. See, e.g., IRS OVERSIGHT BD., FY2011 IRS BUDGET RECOMMENDATION SPECIAL REPORT
9–11 (2010), http://www.treasury.gov/irsob/reports/2010/IRSOB%20FY11%20BUDGET%20REPORT
.pdf.
125. Jada F. Smith, Cyberattack Exposes I.R.S. Tax Returns, N.Y. TIMES (May 26, 2015),
http://nyti.ms/1Hvcdzj.
126. Eric Yoder, ‘Draconian’ Cut to IRS Budget Advances, WASH. POST (June 11, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/federal-eye/wp/2015/06/11/draconian-cut-to-irs-budgetadvances/.
127. See supra notes 8–9.
128. See Yoder, supra note 126 (quoting Rep. Ander Crenshaw (R-Fla.)).
129. Thorndike, The Thorndike Challenge, supra note 10.
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provide it with leads on potential individual and corporate avoidance.130 It
is more likely that exposure of otherwise unknown tax avoidance or
evasion would result from the actions of a financially incentivized
whistleblower, who already has access to information that the IRS cannot
observe, than from a public review of tax return documents already in the
possession of the IRS. Non-governmental parties would also lack the legal
authority to request needed information from a taxpayer to determine
whether the IRS has adequately investigated its claimed tax positions.131
Finally, proponents of broad public disclosure appear to assume that it
would result in IRS accountability without imposing significant costs on
the capacity of the IRS to enforce the tax law effectively. Many proponents
of public disclosure acknowledge that the release of tax return information
could impose costs on taxpayers that should be considered. For example,
several proponents concede that in a public disclosure regime, Social
Security numbers and other sensitive personal information should be
redacted from tax returns before release.132 Yet in terms of the effect on the
IRS, some proponents claim that public disclosure would “not cost the IRS
a nickel.”133 This assumption will be challenged in the next Part.
II. TIMING AND THE TAXING AUTHORITY
While proponents of mandatory public disclosure of tax return
information argue that this approach would empower the public to better
monitor the actions of the IRS, they have not addressed the possibility that
opening tax returns to “millions of eyes”134 could also present costs to tax
administration and enforcement. Some tax return public disclosure
measures would likely hamper the IRS’s efforts to suppress and detect tax
avoidance and evasion, causing the principal to interfere with the agent’s
capacity to satisfy one if its core responsibilities.135 From an accountability

130. I.R.C. §§ 7623(a)–(b) (2016). See, e.g., David Kocieniewski, Whistle-Blower Awarded $104
Million by I.R.S., N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 11, 2012), http://nyti.ms/QhqE0Z (describing $104 million
payment to Bradley Birkenfeld, ex-UBS employee).
131. For recent discussion, see generally Linda Sugin, Invisible Taxpayers (Feb. 9, 2015)
(unpublished manuscript), http://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/upload_documents/LindaSugin.
pdf.
132. See, e.g., Bernasek, supra note 17 (quoting Professor Laurence Kotlikoff).
133. Rooney, supra note 81.
134. Thorndike, The Thorndike Challenge, supra note 10.
135. Blank, Corporate Tax Privacy, supra note 29, at 72–73; Blank, Individual Tax Privacy,
supra note 29, at 292.
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perspective, policymakers should consider potential threats to tax
administration and enforcement in their analysis of proposed public
disclosure initiatives.
As this Part will argue, threats to tax enforcement vary depending on
the type of tax return documentation that would be subject to mandatory
public disclosure. The most significant threats would likely occur where
taxpayers and advisors could observe the tax avoidance strategies of other
taxpayers and the factors that lead the IRS to audit and challenge some of
these strategies. These types of observations would be possible if taxpayers
and advisors could observe the IRS’s enforcement actions that occur ex
post, after taxpayers have pursued transactions and claimed tax positions,
such as the results of audits (or lack thereof) and settlement negotiations.
On the other hand, these threats would be less likely to occur, if at all, if
taxpayers and advisors could observe the advance tax rulings and
agreements that the IRS often provides to taxpayers. These types of actions
occur ex ante, before taxpayers pursue transactions and claim tax positions.
The primary claim presented in this Part is that documents related to a
specific taxpayer’s tax affairs that reflect ex ante tax administration should
be publicly accessible as a means of accountability, but that documents that
reflect ex post tax actions should remain private in order to preserve
effective tax enforcement. This Part details the potential threats to tax
enforcement of public disclosure of ex post tax enforcement and presents
the case for public disclosure of tax return documentation that would reveal
ex ante tax administration. It concludes by considering the potential for
cross-jurisdictional application of this analysis, using the tax transparency
regime of Sweden as a case study.
A. TYPES OF TAXING AUTHORITY ACTIONS
While proponents of tax transparency seek to hold the IRS
accountable for its actions, not all of these actions are of the same stripe.
This Section considers the timing of the IRS’s actions with respect to
specific taxpayers, whether it occurs ex post or ex ante, and briefly
describes the extent to which the public can observe each type of action
under current law.
1. Ex Post Tax Enforcement
The IRS’s ex post tax enforcement actions range from initial audits
and investigations that transpire within the administrative structures of the
IRS to controversies regarding potential tax deficiencies that take place in
federal court.
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Audits and Investigations. Formal IRS audits, which occur after a
taxpayer has filed its tax return, take several forms: “correspondence
audits,” which occur entirely in the form of IRS inquiries and requests for
information by mail; “office audits,” which require a taxpayer to appear in
the local IRS office with copies of any requested additional information;
and “field audits,” which take place at the taxpayer’s home or place of
business as a result of the location of relevant books and records.136 Several
factors determine whether the IRS chooses to pursue a formal audit,
including “red flags” such as inconsistent reporting of information by third
parties and the taxpayer, a high Discriminant Function System (“DIF”)
score—computer scoring that identifies whether the return is likely to result
in a change based on the IRS’s experience with similar tax returns, and
randomness due to the IRS’s need to gather data to construct the DIF score
and for use in other research programs.137 For individual taxpayers, the
formal audit rate is extraordinarily low—0.86% in 2014.138 By contrast,
certain large corporations that participate in the IRS’s “Coordinated
Industry Case” program are under constant IRS audit, in some cases with
IRS agents permanently working in their offices.139
Tax Penalties. Following the review of a taxpayer’s tax return during
an audit, the IRS may assert that the taxpayer owes additional tax penalties.
Most of these penalties consist of monetary sanctions equal to a percentage
of the taxpayer’s underpayment of tax liability, such as delinquency
penalties (up to 25% of tax liability for failure to pay taxes on time)140 or
accuracy penalties (up to 20% of tax liability for understatement of tax due
to acts such as negligence).141
Settlements. A critical ex post tax enforcement tool of the IRS is its
ability to enter into settlement agreements with taxpayers. At the earliest
stage of a potential tax controversy, a taxpayer may pay an asserted tax

136. See IRS Audits, IRS, http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Small-Businesses-&-Self-Employed/
IRS-Audits (last updated Mar. 23, 2017).
137. See The Examination (Audit) Process, IRS, http://www.irs.gov/uac/The-Examination-(Audit)
-Process (last updated Aug. 18, 2012) (describing DIF score).
138. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 2014 INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE DATA BOOK 27 tbl.9a
(2014), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/14databk.pdf.
139. See INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL § 4.46.2.3 (2011), https://www.irs.gov/irm/part4/irm_04046-002.html.
140. I.R.C. §§ 6651(a)(1)–(2) (2016).
141. I.R.C. §§ 6662(a)–(b) (2016).
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deficiency and enter into a settlement agreement with the IRS.142
Taxpayers who choose to challenge a proposed deficiency may later settle
the dispute with the IRS Appeals Division, in which each party signs an
agreement that waives the ability of the taxpayer and the IRS to engage in
future litigation over the issue.143 Other forms of ex post IRS settlements
include “closing agreements,” where the IRS and the taxpayer enter into a
legally binding written agreement to resolve tax liability regarding a
specific issue or year “permanently and conclusively,”144 and “voluntary
disclosure initiatives,” where taxpayers disclose past tax abuses, such as the
use of offshore bank accounts to avoid federal tax liability, in exchange for
reduced tax penalties.145 The IRS settles over 85% of all disputes regarding
proposed tax deficiencies.146
Observability. Current law characterizes nearly all of the documents
that would reveal ex post tax enforcement actions as “return information”
that is protected by the curtain of tax privacy.147 Litigation over contested
tax deficiencies, however, occurs in full view of the public. Additionally,
the curtain of tax privacy does not apply to anonymous statistical
information regarding tax enforcement.148
2. Ex Ante Tax Administration
In contrast to the examples above, sometimes the IRS acts ex ante,
before the taxpayer has pursued a transaction or tax strategy and filed its
tax return, in the form of rulings, agreements, and approvals that the IRS
issues to specific taxpayers.
Rulings. If a taxpayer requests it to do so, the IRS can issue an
advance tax ruling to the taxpayer regarding specific issues before the
taxpayer files its tax return. The most common form of advance tax ruling
is the “private letter ruling,” a written determination issued by the IRS to a

142. See IRS Form 870.
143. See INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL § 8.6.4 (2015), https://www.irs.gov/irm/part8/irm_08006-004.html; IRS Form 870-AD.
144. See INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL § 32.3.4.3 (2004), https://www.irs.gov/irm/part32/irm_32003-004.html.
145. See, e.g., 2012 Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Program, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/uac/2012offshore-voluntary-disclosure-program (last updated Feb. 13, 2017).
146. See, e.g., B. John Williams, Jr., Chief Counsel, Internal Revenue Serv., Resolving Tax
Shelters: By Settlement or Litigation, Address Before the Chicago Bar Association Federal Taxation
Committee (Feb. 25, 2003), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/shelters-feb25.pdf.
147. See I.R.C. § 6103(b)(2) (2016).
148. See id. (excluding data which cannot be associated with or identify an individual taxpayer).
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taxpayer in response to the taxpayer’s inquiry about the status or the tax
effects of the taxpayer’s actions or transactions.149 In a private letter ruling,
the IRS interprets the tax laws and applies them to the taxpayer’s specific
set of facts.150 In exchange for the ruling, the taxpayer must make
numerous representations,151 provide information to the IRS in response to
additional inquiries, and pay the required user fee ($28,300 for many types
of common private letter ruling requests).152
Agreements. The IRS can also enter into agreements with the taxpayer
in advance of the taxpayer’s participation in transactions, and these
agreements may address a period of years. A common type of ex ante
agreement is the Advance Pricing Agreement, which a corporation may
seek in order to avoid future transfer pricing disputes with the IRS.153
Approvals. The IRS can also prevent taxpayers from engaging in
certain activities unless it issues ex ante approval to these taxpayers. A
common example of such an approval is the tax-exempt determination
letter, which the IRS issues to an organization that seeks to be recognized
as a charitable organization described in Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal
Revenue Code.154 Other examples of actions that require ex ante approvals
occur when the IRS must provide administrative relief, authorized by
Sections 301.9100-1 through -3 of the Treasury regulations, in order to
allow taxpayers to make certain tax elections—such as an election to be
recognized as a partnership for U.S. tax purposes—where the deadline for
making these elections has expired.155
Observability. Current law requires the IRS to open to public
inspection “written determinations,” defined as any “ruling, determination
letter, technical advice memorandum, or Chief Counsel advice,”156
including private letter rulings. As Part III will show, however, many forms
of ex ante tax administration are hidden from public view.157

149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

See Rev. Proc. 2015-1, 2015-1 I.R.B. 7 (defining letter ruling).
See id.
See, e.g., Rev. Proc. 96-30, 1996-19 C.B. 8.
See Rev. Proc. 2015-1, 2015-1 I.R.B. 79 (detailing the Schedule of User Fees).
For description, see I.R.S. Announcement 2012-13, 2012-16 I.R.B. 805.
See, e.g., INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., PUBLICATION 4220, APPLYING FOR 501(C)(3) TAXEXEMPT STATUS 10 (2014).
155. See Treas. Reg. §§ 301.9100-1–3 (1997).
156. I.R.C. § 6110(b)(1)(A) (2016).
157. See infra Part III.B.
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B. WHY EX POST TAX ENFORCEMENT SHOULD REMAIN PRIVATE
Broad public disclosure measures, such as those that would require
disclosure of complete tax returns, would reveal otherwise unobservable ex
post tax enforcement actions of the IRS. Complete tax returns contain
many forms and documents that show whether the IRS audited a taxpayer’s
return, entered into a settlement agreement with the taxpayer, or asserted
tax penalties against the taxpayer as a result of a specific offense, among
other actions of the IRS. For example, if the IRS audits an individual’s tax
return and ultimately enters into a settlement with the taxpayer, the
taxpayer’s return information may include IRS Form 870 (Waiver of
Restrictions on Assessment and Collection of Deficiency in Tax and
Acceptance of Overassessment),158 IRS Form 5701 (Notice of Proposed
Adjustment),159 or IRS Form 4549-E (Income Tax Discrepancy
Adjustments),160 each of which describe elements of the settlement and
explain required changes to previously filed tax returns.
To consider the extent to which public disclosure of tax return
information would reveal ex post enforcement actions of the IRS, this
Section presents a hypothetical alternative legal regime in which complete
tax returns of individual and corporate taxpayers would be subject to
mandatory public disclosure. Several advocates of tax transparency have
argued, knowingly or not, in favor of such expansive mandatory public
disclosure.161 And at different points in U.S. tax history, the complete tax
returns of certain taxpayers were indeed open to public inspection.162
As I argue, broad public disclosure of ex post enforcement actions of
the IRS poses significant threats to the IRS’s ability to enforce the tax law
effectively. This Section presents three potential tax administration and
enforcement threats to the IRS from mandatory public disclosure of
complete tax return information: impairment of strategic publicity;
benchmarking; and reverse engineering.163
158. IRS Form 870.
159. IRS Form 5701.
160. IRS Form 4549-E.
161. See, e.g., Avi-Yonah & Siman, supra note 10, at 627; Bartlett, supra note 116; Rampell,
supra note 10; Salmon, supra note 24; Thorndike, Show Us the Money, supra note 10.
162. See, e.g., Act of Aug. 5, 1909, ch. 6, § 38, 36 Stat. 11, 112 (requiring public disclosure of
corporate tax returns); Act of June 30, 1864, ch. 173, § 19, 13 Stat. 223, 228 (requiring public
disclosure of “proceeding of the assessors”).
163. In presenting this analysis, I build upon my prior work on tax privacy and public disclosure
initiatives, Blank, Corporate Tax Privacy, supra note 29; Blank, Individual Tax Privacy, supra note 29,
in two significant ways. First, I show how the enforcement threats outlined below stem directly from
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1. Strategic Publicity
By publicly revealing the IRS’s ex post enforcement actions,
mandatory public disclosure of complete tax return information would
diminish the government’s ability to strategically publicize its tax
enforcement strengths in order to shape the perceptions and compliance
behavior of individual taxpayers. As I have shown in prior work, the
government deliberately publicizes specific examples of its tax
enforcement strengths—audits, tax penalties, and tax litigation victories—
without revealing specific examples of its tax enforcement weaknesses.164
As salient examples involving named individuals have greater potential to
affect individuals’ perceptions and decisions than anonymous statistics, the
government utilizes the “strategic publicity function” of individual tax
privacy to encourage an inflated perception of the government’s ability to
detect tax offenses, punish their perpetrators, and compel all but a few
outliers to comply.165 If the curtain of tax privacy were raised, however,
individuals would observe specific examples of weaknesses in the IRS’s ex
post tax enforcement efforts that would challenge this perception.166
The government actively attempts to shape the perceptions of
individuals regarding key elements of tax enforcement by placing specific
examples of strong tax enforcement actions in front of the curtain of tax
privacy. For example, as Daniel Levin and I found in an empirical study
covering a seven-year period, during the two weeks leading up to April
15th, “Tax Day,” the government issued more than double the number of
press releases describing tax enforcement actions against specific named
individuals, including many celebrities and other high profile taxpayers, per
week than it did during the rest of the year.167 In addition, individuals may
perceive that tax penalties are significantly greater than they actually are, in

the ex post nature of the IRS actions that mandatory public disclosure would reveal. Second, I examine
how and whether each enforcement threat would occur in the context of public disclosure of both
individual and corporate tax return information.
164. See Blank, Individual Tax Privacy, supra note 29, at 328; Joshua D. Blank & Daniel Z.
Levin, When Is Tax Enforcement Publicized?, 30 VA. TAX REV. 1, 8 (2010).
165. See Blank, Individual Tax Privacy, supra note 29, at 328.
166. See id.
167. Blank & Levin, supra note 164, at 8. For the time window ranging from April 1 to April 15,
we found that the government issued 128% more tax enforcement press releases per week than during
the rest of the year. Id. “The negative binomial regression model’s likelihood ratio chi-square [was]
23.48 . . . .” Id. at 16. The p-value was only .0000013 (meaning a one-in-791,637 chance of
randomness). Id.

2017]

THE TIMING OF TAX TRANSPARENCY

475

part because their primary exposure to tax penalties today is to memorable
examples of specific taxpayers who are sentenced to prison for engaging in
tax fraud or who pay high civil tax penalties.168 And individuals may
believe that a challenge from the IRS will lead to a government victory in
court because the government wins the overwhelming majority of publicly
announced civil tax controversies and nearly all criminal tax cases.169
In reality, the IRS lacks the resources to audit all tax returns or even
pursue tax penalties and litigation in many of the cases of tax
noncompliance that it is able to detect.170 Public disclosure of individuals’
complete tax return information, which would include the settlement forms
described earlier, would reveal specific examples of the IRS’s ex post
enforcement actions. These many examples could alter individuals’
perceptions of the IRS’s tax enforcement capabilities. In the absence of tax
privacy, the media and other intermediaries—and ultimately ordinary
citizens—would observe concrete examples of taxpayers who may have
engaged in abusive tax activities, yet were not audited by the IRS, or who,
if they were audited, paid little or no tax penalties.171 Without the curtain of
tax privacy, the media would likely focus on the many specific tax
controversies in which the government regularly chooses to make legal
concessions rather than litigate.172
Public disclosure of the IRS’s ex post enforcement actions poses
significant threats to individual tax compliance. Publicity of examples of
strong tax enforcement against specific taxpayers can inflate taxpayers’
perceptions of the two principal determinants of deterrence: the probability
of detection and the expected costs of noncompliance.173 Survey data
reveals that individuals greatly overestimate the actual likelihood of IRS
detection. While the audit rate for individual taxpayers is less than 1%,
168. See, e.g., Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Former UBS Client Pays $20.8 Million Penalty for
Hiding over $41 Million in Swiss Bank Accounts (Sept. 21, 2010), https://www.justice.gov/archive/
usao/nys/pressreleases/September10/robbinsjulessentencingpr.pdf. See also Blank & Levin, supra note
164, at 18.
169. See Blank, Individual Tax Privacy, supra note 29, at 301. In 2007 and 2010, for instance, the
U.S. Department of Justice won 100% of all litigated federal criminal tax cases. See TREASURY
INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., DEP’T OF TREASURY, REFERENCE NO. 2010-30-059, ACCURACYRELATED PENALTIES ARE SELDOM CONSIDERED PROPERLY DURING CORRESPONDENCE AUDITS 5
(2010).
170. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 138, at iii.
171. See TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., supra note 169, at 5 (IRS failed to
consider accuracy tax penalties in 92% of cases).
172. See generally Williams, supra note 146.
173. See Blank, Individual Tax Privacy, supra note 29, at 303–13.
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studies of taxpayer perceptions of the IRS’s audit rate show that some
individuals believe it is as high as nearly 50%.174 In a public access regime,
salient examples of weak tax enforcement against specific taxpayers could
have the opposite effect on individuals’ perceptions and tax compliance
decisions. The strategic publicity function also supports the government’s
efforts to increase confidence among compliant individuals who are
motivated by feelings of reciprocity, but who will comply with the tax
system only if they believe that other taxpayers are paying their taxes
honestly.175 Without tax privacy, visible examples of the government’s
failure to catch and penalize noncompliant taxpayers could have negative
tax compliance effects on individuals whose compliance is conditional on
that of others.176
Does tax privacy offer similar strategic publicity advantages to the
government when it attempts to increase tax compliance among
corporations? An initial intuition may be that the government utilizes the
curtain of tax privacy strategically by publicizing specific examples of
corporate tax enforcement to influence corporate tax directors’ perceptions
of the risk of tax audits, tax penalties, and tax controversy losses. Tax
directors, after all, are also subject to cognitive biases that can cause them
to make seemingly irrational decisions.
As a result of distinctions between individuals and corporate tax
directors, however, raising the curtain of tax privacy would likely have
little impact on these actors’ perceptions of the risk of IRS enforcement in
many areas. While the IRS highlights its efforts to detect abuse publicly,177
corporate tax directors already expect that their corporations will be subject
to heightened scrutiny by the IRS.178 ExxonMobil Corporation, for
174. See Harold G. Grasmick & Wilbur J. Scott, Tax Evasion and Mechanisms of Social Control:
A Comparison with Grand and Petty Theft, 2 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 213, 222 (1982) (finding 37.9% of
individuals believed they would be caught if they attempted to evade tax); John T. Scholz & Neil
Pinney, Duty, Fear, and Tax Compliance: The Heuristic Basis of Citizenship Behavior, 39 AM. J. POL.
SCI. 490, 497–98 (1995) (finding individuals believed that the probability that their tax returns would be
audited by the IRS was 48%, were they to file false returns).
175. See Samuel Bowles & Herbert Gintis, Is Equality Passé? Homo Reciprocans and the Future
of Egalitarian Politics, BOS. REV., Dec. 1998–Jan. 1999, at 4; Dan M. Kahan, The Logic of Reciprocity:
Trust, Collective Action, and Law, 102 MICH. L. REV. 71, 81–83 (2003).
176. See Blank, Individual Tax Privacy, supra note 29, at 269.
177. See, e.g., Patrick Temple-West, UPDATE 1-U.S. IRS Forms ‘SWAT Team’ for Tax Dodger
Crackdown, REUTERS (Mar. 20, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/usa-tax-irs-transferidUSL1E8EKHU220120320.
178. See Amy S. Elliott, News Analysis: Audit Proof? How Hedge Funds, PE Funds, and PTPs
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example, provides office space at its Houston headquarters to dozens of
IRS agents who engage in “full-time audit[s]” of the corporation’s books
and tax returns.179 Moreover, although a public access regime would enable
corporate tax directors to observe that the IRS rarely imposes most tax
penalties, this revelation would only reinforce corporate tax directors’
current knowledge and beliefs based on their substantial repeat experience
in negotiating with the IRS.180 And while government officials have
boasted of overwhelming odds181 in their favor in corporate tax cases,
corporate tax directors know from experience that the government’s ability
to win corporate tax abuse controversies is not certain. Over the course of
the last decade, the government has lost high-profile corporate tax abuse
cases at the trial level, only to win later on appeal, and vice versa.182
2. Benchmarking
Another potential tax enforcement cost of mandatory public disclosure
of tax return information is that it could unintentionally encourage
aggressive tax planning. By shielding complete tax returns from public
view, the curtain of tax privacy prevents interested parties—shareholders,
corporate managers, and even individual taxpayers—from establishing
benchmarks of aggressiveness in several tax compliance areas and from
pressuring their agents to pursue more aggressive strategies to keep pace
with the tax planning of others. Mandatory public disclosure of complete
tax returns would reveal information about other taxpayers’ tax positions—
and the IRS’s ex post responses to these positions—which, in turn, could
encourage benchmarking.183
In the corporate context, mandatory public disclosure of complete tax
returns would reveal significant information about a corporation’s tax
planning and reporting practices that is not observable today. Although the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) requires all publicly

Escape the IRS, 136 TAX NOTES 351 (2012).
179. See Charles Riley, The American Tax Machine, CNN (May 24, 2011), http://money.cnn.com/
2011/05/24/news/economy/corporate_tax_reform/.
180. For discussion, see David M. Fogel, The Inside Scoop About the IRS’s Appeals Division, 99
TAX NOTES 1503, 1503–04 (2003).
181. Alix Stuart, Don’t Mess with the IRS, CFO (July 15, 2008), http://ww2.cfo.com/accountingtax/2008/07/dont-mess-with-the-irs/ (quoting then-IRS Chief Counsel Donald Korb).
182. See, e.g., Compaq Computer Corp. v. Comm’r, 277 F.3d 778 (5th Cir. 2001); IES Indus., Inc.
v. United States, 253 F.3d 350 (8th Cir. 2001); United Parcel Serv. Of Am., Inc. v. Comm’r, 254 F.3d
1014 (11th Cir. 2001).
183. For additional discussion, see Blank, Corporate Tax Privacy, supra note 29, at 62–69.
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traded corporations to publish detailed non-tax financial information, tax
privacy obscures nearly all tax return information from public view.184
Mandatory public disclosure of complete corporate tax returns, a frequent
proposal of tax law scholars and policymakers,185 would expose documents
that could enable shareholders to determine whether competitor
corporations had engaged in specific related party transfer pricing
strategies186 or had engaged in tax strategies with uncertain legal
outcomes.187
Armed with this newly available information, significant shareholders
of corporations that have not engaged in these strategies could pressure
their corporate managers to consider adopting more aggressive transfer
pricing strategies. As another example, public access to corporations’
“reportable transaction” disclosure forms, which corporations are required
to file with the IRS, could lead activist investors, non-tax managers,
significant shareholders, and corporate tax directors to compare their own
corporation’s tax aggressiveness and tax reporting methods to those of
other corporations.188 An adverse effect of mandatory public disclosure,
thus, is that it could lead to increased external pressure that would likely
influence the tax planning and reporting of corporate tax directors toward
increased tax aggressiveness.
Activist investors, such as private equity and hedge funds, and non-tax
managers would be especially likely to scour publicly available corporate
tax return information to create intercorporate comparisons of tax planning
that could lead to such pressure. In recent years, activist hedge funds have
analyzed available information about their own portfolio corporations’ tax
planning and have often recommended specific actions.189 Campaigns by
private equity investors include efforts to encourage their corporations to
engage in conversions to Real Estate Investment Trusts, tax-free split-offs

184. See, e.g., Blank, Corporate Tax Privacy, supra note 29, at 45–48; Michelle Hanlon, What
Can We Infer About a Firm’s Taxable Income from Its Financial Statements?, 56 NAT’L TAX J. 831,
832 (2003).
185. See, e.g., Avi-Yonah & Siman, supra note 10, at 627; Bartlett, supra note 116; Rampell,
supra note 10; Salmon, supra note 24; Thorndike, Show Us the Money, supra note 10.
186. See, e.g., IRS Form 5471; IRS Form 5472.
187. See DEP’T OF TREASURY, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., INSTRUCTIONS FOR SCHEDULE UTP
(FORM 1120) (2016), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i1120utp.pdf.
188. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4(b) (2014) (describing reportable transactions).
189. See, e.g., Kasmira Jefford, IHG Shareholder Pushes for Tax Inversion Bid, CITY A.M. (Aug.
5, 2014), http://www.cityam.com/1407198172/ihg-shareholder-pushes-tax-inversion-bid.
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of significant businesses,190 and, most recently, corporate inversion
mergers to reduce their U.S. tax liability.191 A consequence of public
disclosure of tax return information of all corporations is that these
investors would gain the ability to evaluate their own corporation’s relative
tax aggressiveness in transfer pricing, potentially abusive tax strategies, and
methods of disclosure to the IRS, among others.
In addition, third parties, such as tax advisory firms, would have a
significant financial incentive to evaluate all publicly available corporate
tax return information in order to assist non-tax managers and corporate tax
directors in meeting benchmarks of tax aggressiveness. This analysis would
likely incorporate whether corporations pursued transactions identified by
the IRS as potentially abusive and whether the IRS responded ex post to the
resulting tax positions. For example, today, each of the major national
accounting firms has a “benchmarking department,” which aids corporate
management in evaluating their own corporation’s performance in areas
such as executive compensation and staffing costs compared to those of
other similar corporations.192 Mandatory public disclosure of complete
corporate tax returns would allow these third parties to provide “tax
efficiency” benchmarking services to encourage conservative tax directors
to consider strategies exhibited by their more aggressive counterparts.
The threat of benchmarking could also occur in response to mandatory
public disclosure of individual tax return information among certain
individuals. As a result of their status as wage earners and their inflated
perceptions of the IRS’s enforcement,193 many individual taxpayers do not
attempt to avoid taxes other than through blatant abuse, such as non-filing,

190. See, e.g., Michael J. De La Merced, Hedge Fund Presses Case for Breakup of Darden
Restaurants, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 17, 2013), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/12/17/hedge-fundpresses-case-for-breakup-of-darden-restaurants/; Jim Polson, Hess Files for Tax-Free Spinoff of GasStation Network, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 8, 2014), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-0108/hess-files-papers-for-tax-free-spinoff-of-gas-station-network.
191. For discussion, see Dana Cimilluca, Dana Mattioli & Joseph Walker, Medical Merger Part of
‘Tax Inversion’ Wave, WALL ST. J. (June 15, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/medical-merger-partof-tax-inversion-wave-1402876390.
192. See Benchmarking, KPMG, https://advisory.kpmg.us/deal-advisory/data-driven-tech/
benchmarking-plus.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2017); Benchmarking Performance Metrics, ERNST &
YOUNG,
http://www.ey.com/us/en/industries/united-states-sectors/health-care/benchmarkingperformance-metrics (last visited Mar. 28, 2017); Global Benchmarking Center, DELOITTE,
http://www2.deloitte.com/us/en/pages/operations/solutions/relevant-benchmarks-data-and-peercomparisons.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2017); PwC Benchmarking, PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS,
http://www.pwc.com/us/en/analytics/benchmarking-services.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2017).
193. See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
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underreporting, or tax fraud.194 However, a small group of wealthy and
sophisticated individual taxpayers regularly attempt to minimize their tax
liabilities through aggressive income tax and estate and gift tax planning
techniques.195 While these individuals do not have shareholders or owners
who exert external pressure on them, some of these individuals appear to
respond to internal pressure to avoid paying more tax than their peers. This
reaction is consistent with reciprocity theory.196 Public disclosure of
complete individual tax returns of others would reveal to some wealthy
individuals that their peers have adopted certain tax avoidance strategies
which they have not considered, such as estate planning vehicles, Roth IRA
conversions, and choices of business entities that limit payroll tax
liabilities. Public disclosure of this information could cause wealthy and
sophisticated individuals to pressure their accountants and advisors to
engage in similar strategies, especially where the IRS has not challenged
the tax positions.
When considering public disclosure proposals, policymakers should
evaluate whether a proposed measure would reveal specific tax planning
information that would encourage benchmarking. Regarding publicly
traded corporations, I have argued elsewhere that public disclosure of
certain documents, such as the one-page Form 1120, Schedule M-3, and a
summary “pink slip” containing basic tax information, would be unlikely to
reveal new information that would lead to benchmarking effects if subject
to mandatory public disclosure.197 Yet others, such as proposals to require
public disclosure of complete tax returns, would enable granular
comparative analyses of tax aggressiveness in specific areas.
3. Reverse Engineering
By revealing all ex post tax enforcement decisions of the IRS through
the release of certain forms and other documents, mandatory public
disclosure of complete tax returns would also enable taxpayers and their
advisors to reverse engineer the IRS’s strategies for detecting and
194. See, e.g., Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Rhode Island Machine Shop Owners Convicted of
Tax Fraud (Mar. 30, 2009), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/rhode-island-couple-sentenced-prison-taxevasion.
195. See, e.g., Alexander Arapoglou & Jerri-Lynn Scofield, 10 Tax Dodges that Help the Rich Get
Richer, SALON (Apr. 12, 2013), http://www.salon.com/2013/04/12/10_tax_dodges_that_help_the_rich_
get_richer_partner/.
196. See supra note 175.
197. Blank, Reconsidering Corporate Tax Privacy, supra note 29, at 109–20.
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challenging abusive tax positions. Mandatory public disclosure of complete
tax returns would display the IRS’s ex post treatment of all taxpayers’ tax
returns, including the vast majority of tax returns and tax positions that the
IRS did not audit or challenge. By exposing the IRS’s playbook to
taxpayers, advisors, and analysts indirectly, mandatory public disclosure
could hinder the IRS’s efforts to deter and detect aggressive tax planning.
The potential for reverse engineering in response to public disclosure
of complete tax return information is especially relevant among corporate
taxpayers, where legal ambiguity often encourages aggressive tax planning.
Mandatory public disclosure of complete tax return information would
enable sophisticated analysts to observe the details of tax controversies
where the IRS asserted tax deficiencies, imposed tax penalties, and agreed
to settlements with corporations. Many corporate tax directors and their
advisors, for instance, have expressed “uncertainty”198 and “anxiety”199
regarding the factors that the IRS uses to determine whether to apply a 40%
strict liability tax penalty for transactions that lack “economic
substance.”200 With access to complete tax returns, including IRS Form
5701 and IRS Form 4549, corporate tax directors could observe whether
corporations’ use of specific transfer pricing structures or tax avoidance
products cause the IRS to audit and challenge these tax positions or to seek
anti-abuse tax penalties ex post. This newfound knowledge—which would
stem from the use of quantitative, not solely qualitative, measures—could
lead some tax directors to refrain from pursuing strategies likely to draw
IRS attention. It also could cause some tax directors to realize that they
should adopt more aggressive tax strategies than they have historically, as
these strategies do not appear to have resulted in challenges from the IRS.
Public disclosure of complete tax return information could similarly
lead to reverse engineering by wealthy and sophisticated individuals who
also engage in tax planning that exploits legal ambiguity. For these
individuals, the threshold levels of tax avoidance necessary to trigger IRS
detection are uncertain in areas such as use of Subchapter S corporations to
avoid payroll taxes,201 charitable contributions of appreciated property like
198. Jeremiah Coder, Economic Substance Guidance Should Reassure, Official Says, 133 TAX
NOTES 1318, 1318 (2011).
199. Jodi J. Schwartz, Economic Substance Doctrine and Subchapter C: What, Me Worry?, 89
TAXES 113, 133 (2011).
200. I.R.C. § 6662(b)(6) (2016).
201. See, e.g., Peter J. Reilly, S Corporation SE Avoidance Still a Solid Strategy, FORBES (Aug.
25, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/peterjreilly/2013/08/25/s-corporation-se-avoidance-still-a-solidstrategy/.
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artwork,202 and characterization of household service providers as
independent contractors rather than employees.203 Uncertainty aversion
may cause some of these individuals to comply with the tax law.204 The
potential for reverse engineering to alleviate this uncertainty could
encourage some of these individual taxpayers to increase their use of
aggressive tax avoidance strategies.
With the ability to observe the ex post enforcement actions of the IRS
through public disclosure of complete tax return information, tax advisory
and data analysis firms would gain increased opportunity to create
statistical models that show which types of tax positions are most likely to
result in detection and successful challenge by the IRS. For instance, in
light of the empirical possibilities offered by public disclosure, corporate
tax directors and wealthy individuals could demand predictive models from
the major accounting and other tax advisory firms that analyze whether
certain tax reporting and filing actions in different circumstances would
cause the IRS to utilize audits, deficiency assertions, and tax penalties. The
major accounting firms currently do not publicize the use of such models
using client data, possibly due to contractual restrictions on using clients’
return information or out of concern that this action could attract scrutiny
from regulators or Congress.205 The introduction of mandatory public
disclosure of tax return information, however, could provide these firms
with an opening to market statistical modeling of IRS behavior. Public
availability of tax return data would likely also result in competition from
data analysis groups, such as Audit Analytics206 and others,207 that do not
202. See, e.g., Zachary R. Mider, How Wal-Mart’s Waltons Maintain Their Billionaire Fortune:
Taxes, BLOOMBERG BUSINESS (Sept. 12, 2003), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-0912/how-wal-mart-s-waltons-maintain-their-billionaire-fortune-taxes (describing art donations).
203. See, e.g., Independent Contractor (Self-Employed) or Employee?, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/
businesses/small-businesses-self-employed/independent-contractor-self-employed-or-employee
(last
updated Mar. 23, 2017).
204. See, e.g., Jeff T. Casey & John T. Scholz, Boundary Effects of Vague Risk Information on
Taxpayer Decisions, 50 ORG. BEHAV. & HUMAN DECISION PROCESSES 360, 363–64 (1991); Mark P.
Gergen, Uncertainty and Tax Enforcement: A Case for Moderate Fault-Based Penalties, 64 TAX L.
REV. 453, 472–74 (2010); Sarah B. Lawsky, Modeling Uncertainty in Tax Law, 65 STAN. L. REV. 241,
244 (2013).
205. See, e.g., KPMG, GENERAL TERMS OF KPMG FIDUCIAIRE (2011) (on file with author)
(“KPMG . . . shall treat all information provided to it either prior to or in the course of delivering the
Services as confidential . . . .”).
206. Audit Analytics Peer Reporter, AUDIT ANALYTICS, http://www.auditanalytics.com/0002/
peer-reporter.php (last visited Mar. 28, 2017).
207. See generally AMIR D. ACZEL, HOW TO BEAT THE I.R.S. AT ITS OWN GAME (1995)
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offer tax advisory services currently.
Several examples offer a window into possible uses of publicly
disclosed tax return information to produce predictive modeling of tax
enforcement. In a recent study, Jacob Thornock and others attempted to
examine how the IRS selects taxpayers to examine or what information it
uses in its enforcement mission.208 Their study focused on the IRS’s
approach to investigating corporate taxpayers by reviewing the timing and
frequency of reviews of publicly filed SEC annual reports by IRS agents
(the SEC provided the data regarding IRS downloads in response to a
Freedom of Information Act request).209 The researchers then analyzed
whether certain firm-specific characteristics, such as changes in net
operating losses and cash holdings, were statistically more likely to result
in attention by the IRS.210 As another example, when individuals use
TurboTax, a popular tax preparation program, to complete their personal
tax returns, the software indicates whether the probability of an IRS audit is
high or low using its “Audit Risk Meter.”211 Public disclosure of complete
tax returns would enable similar, but more detailed and sophisticated
predictions regarding the factors that lead the IRS to pursue audits,
deficiency assessments, and tax penalties.
Public disclosure of complete tax returns, thus, raises the same
concern as disclosure of factors that contribute to the IRS’s DIF score and
other mechanisms the IRS uses for selecting tax returns for audit. Congress
has recognized the potential enforcement risks of publicizing this
information, providing that the IRS shall not be required to disclose to
taxpayers “standards used or to be used for the selection of returns for
examination, or data used or to be used for determining such
standards . . . .”212 Courts have similarly recognized the IRS’s need to
redact information from legally required public disclosures if they would
reveal the “scope, direction, or emphasis of audit activity.”213 Policymakers
should apply similar treatment to proposals that would expose information
(analyzing public information to model IRS behavior).
208. See generally Jacob R. Thornock et al., IRS Attention (2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2529268.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. See Top Five Ways to Avoid a Tax Audit, INTUIT TURBO TAX, https://turbotax.intuit.com/taxtools/tax-tips/Tax-Planning-and-Checklists/Top-Five-Ways-to-Avoid-a-Tax-Audit/INF19031.html (last
visited Mar. 28, 2017).
212. I.R.C. § 6103(b) (2016).
213. Tax Analysts v. IRS, 117 F.3d 607, 619–20 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
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critical to the IRS’s enforcement strategies through reverse engineering.
C. WHY EX ANTE TAX ADMINISTRATION SHOULD BE PUBLIC
When evaluating tax return information that could be subject to
mandatory public disclosure in service of increased tax transparency,
policymakers should consider characteristics that differentiate ex post tax
enforcement from ex ante tax administration. From the perspective of a
principal that seeks to hold its agent accountable without impeding the
agent from completing its assigned responsibilities, there is a more
compelling case for mandatory public disclosure of IRS actions that
constitute ex ante tax administration than that represent ex post tax
enforcement. Three primary justifications for mandatory public disclosure
of documents that would reveal ex ante tax administration are discussed
below: sociological legitimacy of the IRS; efficiency; and absence of
threats to the IRS’s enforcement capabilities.
1. Sociological Legitimacy
Sociological legitimacy is a core objective for any administrative
agency, including the IRS. Compared to models of legitimacy that depend
on moral or legal authority, the sociological legitimacy of an action or
institution of the government hinges on whether “the relevant public
regards it as justified, appropriate, or otherwise deserving of support for
reasons beyond fear of sanctions or mere hope for personal reward.”214
Some individuals fail to comply with existing tax law when they view the
law or the institution that applies it as illegitimate.215 A lack of sociological
legitimacy may also hamper the IRS’s attempts to propose new rules and
regulations without encountering significant skepticism and delay.216 And
when legislators, on behalf of their constituents, reject the legitimacy of
certain actions of the IRS, they may respond by denying the agency’s

214. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1787, 1795
(2005). See also JAMES O. FREEDMAN, CRISIS AND LEGITIMACY: THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS AND
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 10–11 (1978); Michael L. Wells, “Sociological Legitimacy” in Supreme
Court Opinions, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1011, 1017–22 (2007).
215. See, e.g., Karyl A. Kinsey, Deterrence and Alienation Effects of IRS Enforcement: An
Analysis of Survey Data, in WHY PEOPLE PAY TAXES: TAX COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT 259, 259
(Joel Slemrod ed., 1992); John T. Scholz & Mark Lubell, Trust and Taxpaying: Testing the Heuristic
Approach to Collective Action, 42 AM. J. POL. SCI. 398, 408 (1998).
216. See Darryl K. Brown, Criminal Law’s Unfortunate Triumph over Administrative Law, 7 J.L.
ECON. & POL’Y 657, 668 (2011).
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budgetary requests.217 Several features of the absence of tax transparency
of ex ante tax administration present a greater threat to the sociological
legitimacy of the IRS than preservation of current tax privacy rules for acts
of ex post tax enforcement.
Secret Tax Law. Without tax transparency, taxpayers may perceive
that the IRS lacks legitimacy by creating secret tax law through the
issuance of advance tax rulings. In response to this concern, Congress
provided in Section 6110 of the Internal Revenue Code that “written
determinations,” such as private letter rulings, should be open to public
inspection.218 In enacting this provision, Congress explicitly sought to
counter the public perception of the development of secret tax law. Prior to
the enactment of this statute, when only the taxpayers and advisors who
requested private letter rulings had “special access to these rules of law,”219
Congress believed that the lack of public disclosure “tended to reduce
public confidence in the tax laws.”220
As a result of its unique bargaining position, the IRS has greater
freedom to express and apply its own interpretation of the tax law when
issuing advance tax rulings than when challenging a tax position ex post. In
a tax deficiency dispute following an audit, the IRS Appeals Division often
concedes legal issues to the taxpayer, as illustrated by its high settlement
rate.221 In contrast, when a taxpayer seeks a private letter ruling regarding a
proposed transaction, the taxpayer will wait to pursue the transaction until
the IRS issues its ruling. For example, in January 2015, Yahoo Inc.
announced that it would distribute its stock in Alibaba Group Holding Ltd.
in a tax-free spin-off transaction, enabling Yahoo to avoid over $16 billion
in tax liability and that it would seek a private letter ruling.222 Shortly
thereafter, the IRS announced that it would refrain from issuing private
letter rulings involving this type of spin-off transaction where the active
trade or business of the distributing corporation or the controlled
corporation is small compared to other assets.223 Not only did the Yahoo217. See Yoder, supra note 126 and accompanying text.
218. I.R.C. § 6110 (2016).
219. S. REP. NO. 94-938, pt. 1, at 305 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3438, 3735.
220. Id.
221. See Williams, supra note 146.
222. See Press Release, Yahoo, Yahoo Announces Plan for Tax-Free Spin-Off of Remaining
Stake in Alibaba Group (Jan. 27, 2015), https://investor.yahoo.net/releasedetail.cfm?releaseid=893147.
223. See Vindu Goel & Michael J. de la Merced, I.R.S. Look at Spinoffs May Affect Yahoo Plan,
N.Y. TIMES (May 19, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/20/technology/irs-look-at-spinoffsmay-affect-yahoo-plan.html. The IRS subsequently confirmed this policy by declining to rule on
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Alibaba transaction come to a halt, but within minutes of the announcement
from the IRS, the stock price of Yahoo plummeted by more than 10%.224
Eventually, the potential multi-billion dollar tax risk, exacerbated by the
absence of a private letter ruling, caused Yahoo to abandon its proposed tax
strategy.225 As a result of its power in exercising discretion to issue a
private letter ruling, the IRS can, and often does, require the taxpayer to
make representations regarding its future activities that exceed statutory
requirements.226 It can rule without concern that the taxpayer will later
challenge the IRS in settlement negotiations or in court. Only public
disclosure can allow all taxpayers to observe the IRS’s ex ante
interpretations of the tax law.
Through public disclosure, the public and policymakers can engage in
debate regarding the legal interpretations of the IRS as expressed in ex ante
tax administration, which would contradict the perception that the IRS
creates tax law in secret and without accountability. For instance, in 2008
and 2009, the IRS issued several notices that applied prospectively and
altered the application of Section 382 of the Code, which governs the use
of net operating losses following an ownership change, for corporations
that participated in the government’s Troubled Asset Relief Program.227
Following the public issuances of these notices, members of Congress held
hearings, requested additional information from the IRS, and even
introduced legislation that sought to nullify the notices.228 While some
questioned whether the IRS acted in a manner that was consistent with the
relevant statutory tax law or any grant of authority from Congress,229 the
Yahoo’s ruling request regarding the spin-off of Alibaba. See Yahoo! Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K)
(Sept. 2, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1011006/000119312515314494/d35793d8k.
htm.
224. See Brian Womack & Richard Rubin, Yahoo Sticks to Spinoff Plan as IRS Triggers Share
Slump, BLOOMBERG BUSINESS (May 19, 2015), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-0519/yahoo-shares-drop-on-potential-changes-to-irs-s-spinoff-rules.
225. See Press Release, Yahoo, Yahoo Provides Update on Planned Spin Off of Remaining Stake
in Alibaba Group (Dec. 9, 2015), https://investor.yahoo.net/releasedetail.cfm?releaseid=946231.
226. See, e.g., Rev. Proc. 96-30, 1996-19 C.B. 8 (detailing the required taxpayer representations).
227. See I.R.S. Notice 2008-76, 2008-39 I.R.B. 768; I.R.S. Notice 2008-84, 2008-41 I.R.B. 855;
I.R.S. Notice 2008-100, 2008-44 I.R.B. 1081; I.R.S. Notice 2010-2, 2010-2 I.R.B. 251.
228. See, e.g., A Bill to provide that Internal Revenue Service Notice 2010–2 shall have no force
and effect and to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to restrict the authority of the Secretary of
the Treasury to prescribe regulations under section 382 of such Code, S. 2916, 111th Cong. (2009).
229. See, e.g., Eric Rasmusen & J. Mark Ramseyer, Can the Treasury Exempt Companies It Owns
from Taxes? The $45 Billion General Motors Loss Carryforward Rule, in THE CATO PAPERS ON
PUBLIC POLICY 20–22 (Jeffrey Miron ed., 2011).
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ability of all taxpayers to observe these rulings through public disclosure
spurred Congress to engage in this debate. If, on the other hand, tax privacy
had prevented taxpayers from learning of these legal rulings until years
later, if at all, public distrust of the IRS could have grown.
Equity. Without tax transparency, the public may perceive that the IRS
treats taxpayers inequitably when issuing advance tax rulings and
approvals. Because the IRS dictates the issues upon which it will deliver
advance tax rulings, requires taxpayers to follow uniform guidelines in
submitting representations and supporting information, and reviews all
ruling requests, taxpayers are justified in expecting the IRS to treat
similarly situated taxpayers equally.
Mandatory public disclosure enables taxpayers to determine whether
the IRS has met this equity standard. Some courts have even held that
while taxpayers are restricted from relying on private letter rulings issued
to other taxpayers as precedent,230 they can introduce private letter rulings
as evidence that the IRS has abused its discretion in issuing different
rulings to two directly competing taxpayers. For example, in the 1960s,
IBM and its main competitor, Remington Rand, requested private letter
rulings from the IRS regarding identical products within weeks of one
another.231 The IRS issued a favorable ruling to Remington Rand, but did
not issue a favorable ruling to IBM.232 The Court of Claims allowed IBM
to introduce this disparity as evidence and recover taxes that it paid from
the IRS.233 Without public disclosure, taxpayers could suspect that even
though the IRS has defined the requirements for requesting and obtaining a
private letter ruling in as uniform a manner as possible, it uses the curtain
of tax privacy as a way to apply the tax law differently to similar facts.
There is a lower risk of public perception of inequitable treatment in
the case of ex post tax enforcement. Just as a police officer stops only a
small subset of drivers who exceed the posted speed limit,234 the IRS audits
only a sliver of all tax returns.235 Taxpayers who are aware of the existence
of an “audit lottery” know that the IRS will not apply the tax law equally to
similarly situated taxpayers simply because it will not audit all tax returns.
230. I.R.C. § 6110(k)(3) (2016).
231. IBM Corp. v. United States, 343 F.2d 914, 916 (Ct. Cl. 1965).
232. Id. at 916–17.
233. Id. at 924.
234. See Illya Litchtenberg, Police Discretion and Traffic Enforcement: A Government of Men?,
50 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 425, 427 n.13 (2002).
235. See Internal Revenue Serv., supra note 138.

488

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 90:449

And in contrast to advance tax rulings, where the IRS requires uniform
representations and supporting evidence from taxpayers on a narrowly
defined set of issues, ex post audits are more likely to involve divergent
facts, especially where the IRS has selected a tax return for audit as a result
of multiple instances of tax noncompliance. Some fact patterns will make it
more likely that the IRS can prevail in court than others. For these reasons,
courts have consistently held that the IRS does not owe taxpayers a “duty
of consistency” when selecting tax returns for audits or entering into
settlement agreements.236
Integrity. Non-disclosure of ex ante tax administration also threatens
the sociological legitimacy of the IRS by causing the public to question the
agency’s integrity. Private letter rulings and Advance Pricing Agreements
are frequently characterized as “tax deals.”237 The use of the term “deals”
implies that the IRS acts as a partner with the taxpayer by facilitating its tax
strategies prospectively. Private letter rulings and Advance Pricing
Agreements function in the same manner as tax insurance, but taxpayers
can obtain this insurance with significantly less expense from the IRS than
from third-party insurers.238 Despite the IRS’s relatively strong bargaining
power compared to taxpayers when negotiating advance tax rulings and
agreements, the public may perceive that, under these circumstances, the
IRS makes costly concessions or, worse, engages in impropriety.
Mandatory public disclosure of ex ante tax administration, consequently, is
essential to protecting the integrity of the IRS in the eyes of the public.
Lack of transparency in the advance ruling context can also encourage
suspicions of impropriety, as taxpayers may perceive that IRS officials
favor specific taxpayers. For example, in 2013, the Treasury Inspector
General for Tax Administration (“TIGTA”) issued a report criticizing the
IRS for failing to create policies that prevent taxpayers from directing their

236. See Vons Companies, Inc. v. United States, 51 Fed. Cl. 1, 10 (2001). For discussion, see
Stephanie Hoffer, Hobgoblin of Little Minds No More: Justice Requires an IRS Duty of Consistency,
2006 UTAH L. REV. 317, 318; Christopher M. Pietruszkiewicz, Does the Internal Revenue Service Have
a Duty to Treat Similarly Situated Taxpayers Similarly?, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 531 (2005).
237. See, e.g., Jeremy Scott, Shedding Light on Advance Pricing Agreements, HUFFINGTON POST
(Sept. 22, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jeremy-scott/shedding-light-on-advance_b_3639306.
html (referring to “deals that heavily favor corporate taxpayers”); Lisa Nadal, Who Killed the Senate
APA Report?, TAX NOTES TODAY (Jan. 15, 2008), http://www.taxnotes.com/worldwide-taxdaily/transfer-pricing-and-apportionment-issues/news-analysis-who-killed-senate-apa-report/2008/01/
15/7929031 (referring to “sweeter deal” negotiated by IRS).
238. See Rev. Proc. 2015-1, 2015-1 I.R.B. 79, supra note 152.
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private letter ruling requests to specific reviewing IRS attorneys.239 Under
policies in effect at the time, an IRS attorney that received multiple
requests for private letter rulings from a specific law firm could retain up to
two-thirds of these letter ruling requests.240 While TIGTA reported no
evidence of malfeasance or corruption, it warned the IRS that this policy
could create the appearance that “practitioners could possibly manipulate
the letter ruling process” by seeking “inappropriate favorable rulings.”241
At least one tax practitioner defended the strategy of requesting particular
IRS attorneys to review private letter ruling requests “not because he’s your
buddy, but because he’s going to get to the right answer.”242 Without public
disclosure, public perceptions of impropriety between tax officials and
taxpayers involving ex ante tax administration would likely increase.
The public is less likely to perceive the IRS has engaged in favoritism
toward specific taxpayers or acts of impropriety during audits and
negotiations over settlement agreements. In ex post tax enforcement
situations, the transaction has already occurred. The IRS does not facilitate
the transaction prospectively by assuring desired tax benefits. The
consequences of the taxpayer’s uncertain tax positions may also have
already had an effect in the taxpayer’s financial statements even before an
audit by the IRS has occurred,243 reducing the stakes of a tax controversy
compared to an advance tax ruling request. Further, increased levels of
review involved in ex post tax enforcement situations, including by
officials within the IRS Appeals Division, the Joint Committee on
Taxation, and the U.S. Tax Court,244 reduce potential appearances of
impropriety between taxpayers engaged in tax controversies and IRS
officials.

239. TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., 2013-10-081, CHIEF COUNSEL SHOULD TAKE
STEPS TO MINIMIZE THE RISK OF OUTSIDE INFLUENCE ON ITS LETTER RULINGS (2013),
https://www.treasury.gov/tigta/auditreports/2013reports/201310081fr.html.
240. See id. (describing two-thirds rule).
241. Id.
242. Amy S. Elliott, TIGTA Says Chief Counsel Offices at Risk for Outside Influence on Letter
Rulings, TAX NOTES (Sept. 19, 2013), http://www.taxnotes.com/tax-notes-today/corporatetaxation/tigta-says-chief-counsel-offices-risk-outside-influence-letter-rulings/2013/09/19/f75c? (quoting
anonymous tax practitioner).
243. See 2 ACCOUNTING STANDARDS CODIFICATION § 740-10-55-3 (FIN. ACCOUNTING
STANDARDS BD. 2009) (preventing recognition of tax benefits unless they are “more likely than not” to
be upheld if audited by the IRS and subject to judicial review).
244. For discussion, see supra notes 137–146 and accompanying text.
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2. Efficiency
In addition to preserving sociological legitimacy of the IRS, public
disclosure of advance tax rulings and agreements supports a core rationale
of these devices: to alleviate legal uncertainty and encourage efficient
transactions. Some taxpayers forego business transactions as a result of tax
uncertainty. By obtaining ex ante tax administration, such as a private letter
ruling, a taxpayer generally can pursue its transaction without fear that the
IRS will subsequently challenge the tax treatment of the transaction.
Mandatory public disclosure of advance tax rulings encourages other
taxpayers to seek these rulings themselves, which ultimately leads them to
execute transactions free of distortions caused by tax law uncertainty. By
publicly disclosing an advance tax ruling received by a taxpayer, the IRS
reveals to other similarly situated taxpayers the specific legal issues and
fact patterns on which it will rule.
The IRS, for example, issues private letter rulings regarding
“significant issues” in tax-free spin-off transactions, which are legal issues
“the resolution of which is not essentially free from doubt and that is
germane to determining the tax consequences of the transaction.”245 As
discussed earlier, in January 2015, Yahoo Inc. announced its decision to
distribute its stock in Alibaba Group Holding Ltd. in a multi-billion dollar
tax-free spin-off transaction.246 Even though Yahoo’s proposed spin-off
transaction involved significant legal uncertainty regarding the “active
trade or business” requirement, Yahoo announced the transaction and
requested a private letter ruling after a competitor corporation, Liberty
Interactive, participated in a similar transaction involving TripAdvisor, a
portfolio corporation.247 As one commentator noted at the time of the
Yahoo-Alibaba announcement, “Yahoo likely would not have pursued its
planned transaction in the first place had it not been bolstered by a recent
letter ruling . . . blessing what is believed to be the spinoff by Liberty
Interactive Corp. of TripAdvisor Inc.”248

245. Rev. Proc. 2013-32, 2013-28 I.R.B. 55.
246. See Yahoo, supra note 222.
247. For discussion, see Michael J. de la Merced, How Yahoo’s Spinoff of Its Alibaba Stake Will
Work, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 27, 2015), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2015/01/27/how-yahoos-spinoff-of-itsalibaba-stake-will-work/.
248. Amy S. Elliot, IRS Announces Spinoff Ruling Pause; Yahoo Implicated?, 147 TAX NOTES
857 (2015) (quoting Robert Willens).
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Even if taxpayers do not request advance tax rulings or enter into
advance tax agreements, public disclosure of these actions alleviates legal
uncertainty and can encourage efficient transactions. While taxpayers
cannot rely on other taxpayers’ private letter rulings as binding
precedent,249 they can look to these rulings for guidance regarding the
IRS’s own interpretation of ambiguous tax law issues. For instance, in
2014, the IRS announced that it would suspend its private letter ruling
program regarding activities that are “qualifying income” by master limited
partnerships, which would be necessary in order for these entities to retain
partnership status for tax purposes.250 Taxpayers commented that the lack
of private letter rulings would deter efficient business transactions,
especially in the oil and gas industry.251 When the IRS resumed issuing
private letter rulings on this issue in 2015, taxpayers and their advisors
were eager to observe the IRS’s “workable standards” as applied in rulings,
even if they did not plan to request the rulings themselves.252
Additionally, the representations that the IRS requires taxpayers to
submit before receiving a private letter ruling, which are currently open to
public inspection, often reduce legal ambiguity by becoming the default
interpretation that taxpayers rely on in pursuing transactions. For instance,
the IRS’s required representation regarding the “substantially all”
requirement of certain tax-free reorganizations has become the de facto
legal rule that taxpayers seek to satisfy.253 Without public disclosure of
these representations in private letter rulings, the legal uncertainty
surrounding this issue, and many others, could prevent taxpayers from
pursuing certain forms of corporate mergers and acquisitions.
Contrary to the increased efficiency that results from public disclosure
of advance tax rulings, public disclosure of documents that reveal the IRS’s
ex post tax enforcement could encourage wasteful tax planning. Public
disclosure of complete tax return information, as discussed earlier, would
enable taxpayers to determine the IRS’s tax enforcement approaches, rather
than reveal issues on which the IRS will provide an advance tax ruling that
249. I.R.C. § 6110(k)(3) (2016).
250. See Patrick Temple West & Anna Driver, IRS Puts Damper on Newer Types of Energy
Partnerships, REUTERS (Apr. 8, 2014, 5:55 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-investment-energyirs-idUSBREA371I320140408.
251. See id.
252. ERNST & YOUNG, IRS ENDS MLP PRIVATE LETTER RULING “MORATORIUM” (Mar. 2015),
http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/EY-master-limited-partnership-alert-march-2015/$FILE/
EY-master-limited-partnership-alert-march-2015.pdf.
253. Rev. Proc. 77-37, 1977-2 C.B. 568.
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could facilitate a non-tax motivated transaction.254 The consequence of
such reverse engineering is that taxpayers may pursue tax avoidance
strategies that do not result in IRS detection or challenge, a distortion of
taxpayer behavior. Moreover, public disclosure of ex post tax enforcement
would reduce legal uncertainty in situations where Congress deliberately
enacted legally ambiguous standards in order to deter taxpayers from
pursuing aggressive tax planning. For instance, public disclosure of
complete tax return information would reveal circumstances under which
the IRS applies the 40% economic substance tax penalty, undermining the
efficacy of this particular tax penalty.255 As this example illustrates, public
disclosure should be utilized as a means of reducing tax law uncertainty,
but only where this effect is desirable from an efficiency perspective.
3. Absence of Enforcement Risk
Mandatory public release of documents that would expose ex ante tax
administration do not pose the same threats to tax enforcement and
administration—such as interference with the IRS’s strategic publicity
efforts, initiation of benchmarking by taxpayers, and facilitation of reverse
engineering by taxpayers, their advisors, and financially incentivized third
parties—as mandatory public disclosure of documents that would show ex
post enforcement actions.
Strategic Publicity. While public release of complete tax return
information would offer specific examples of the IRS’s failure to audit
certain taxpayers, apply tax penalties, and pursue litigation in most tax
controversies,256 public disclosure of advance rulings, agreements, and
approvals would not offer comparable examples of these weaknesses.
Advance tax rulings affect a narrow set of legal issues on which the
IRS consents to provide rulings in advance, which bear little relationship to
factors that influence many individuals’ tax compliance decisions.257 It is
highly unlikely, for instance, that an individual taxpayer’s perceptions
regarding whether the IRS will pursue civil or criminal fraud tax penalties
cases involving small offshore bank accounts is affected in any meaningful
way by the public release of a private letter ruling that states that a

254.
255.
256.
257.

See supra notes 198–213 and accompanying text.
I.R.C. § 6662(b)(6) (2016).
See supra notes 164–182 and accompanying text.
See Rev. Proc. 2015-3, 2015-1 I.R.B. 144 (describing when IRS will and will not rule).
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corporation can engage in a tax-free reorganization under Section
368(a)(1)(F) of the Code even though shareholders will sell stock of the
corporation immediately after the reorganization.258 Unlike public
disclosure of complete tax return information, including the results of
settlements involving offshore bank accounts and other forms of tax
avoidance and evasion,259 public disclosure advance tax rulings would not
reveal the IRS’s capacity to audit tax returns or apply tax penalties.
Second, unlike ex post tax controversies, the IRS retains discretion to
refrain from issuing advance tax rulings or entering into advance tax
agreements. Because the IRS lacks the resources to litigate every instance
of tax avoidance it identifies, it deploys mass settlement programs, such as
the Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Program,260 that allows many taxpayers
to obtain favorable terms compared to the possible results of litigation.
Public disclosure of complete tax returns would reveal the results of these
settlements involving specific taxpayers, including many highly salient
examples.261 On the other hand, if the IRS does not consider the facts of a
specific taxpayer’s proposed transaction to merit a publicly accessible
advance tax ruling, including taking into account the effects on the tax
planning of other taxpayers, the IRS can decline to issue the ruling.262
Last, unlike mandatory public disclosure of the terms of tax deficiency
settlement agreements with specific taxpayers, public disclosure of advance
tax rulings explicitly state that taxpayers have complied with the relevant
tax law. After reciting the taxpayers’ representations, many private letter
rulings conclude with approving language from the IRS, such as “we have
determined that you fulfilled the requirements”263 or “we conclude that the
proposed modifications comply.”264 Compared to public disclosure of ex
post IRS settlements that highlight taxpayers’ noncompliance, public
disclosure of private letter rulings bolster the perception that the taxpayers

258. For discussion, see IRS Rules that “F” Reorganization Can Be Used to Strip Retained Assets
Before Sale, MCGUIREWOODS (Mar. 15, 2011), https://www.mcguirewoods.com/Client-Resources/
Alerts/2011/3/IRS-Rules-that-F-Reorganization-Can-Be-Used-to-Strip-Retained-Assets-Before-Sale.
aspx
259. See supra notes 170–172 and accompanying text.
260. See Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Program Frequently Asked Questions and Answers 2014,
IRS,
https://www.irs.gov/individuals/international-taxpayers/offshore-voluntary-disclosure-programfrequently-asked-questions-and-answers-2012-revised (last updated Feb. 9, 2017).
261. See id.
262. See Rev. Proc. 2015-1, 2015-1 I.R.B. 1.
263. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 201528001 (July 10, 2015).
264. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 201521003 (May 22, 2015).
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requesting the ruling will engage in de facto tax compliance rather than
illegitimate tax avoidance.
Benchmarking. Mandatory public release of the IRS’s advance tax
rulings and agreements also poses little risk of encouraging taxpayers to
increase their use of tax avoidance strategies in order to meet benchmarks
of tax aggressiveness.265 Unlike the tax positions that trigger audits and tax
controversies over deficiency assertions, the issues that are the subject of
advance tax rulings are not aggressive tax positions that rely on
questionable interpretations of the tax law. Instead, private letter rulings
often feature transactions where taxpayers seek assurance that they have
satisfied the requirements of statutes that explicitly provide tax benefits,
such as deferral of tax liability in tax-free reorganizations.266 Taxpayers
seek private letter rulings when they claim conservative tax positions,
especially because when doing so, they knowingly subject themselves to
increased IRS scrutiny and multiple requests for voluminous
information.267
Reverse Engineering. Finally, public disclosure of advance tax rulings
would not enable taxpayers, advisors, and other third parties to reverse
engineer IRS’s enforcement strategies.268 Private letter rulings, advance tax
agreements, and approvals do not offer indicia of the IRS’s methodology in
selecting tax returns for audit, asserting tax deficiencies, or pursuing tax
penalties. Instead of leading taxpayers and their advisors to attempt to
determine the probability of enforcement by the IRS, including by
developing statistical models, public disclosure of documents showing ex
ante forms of tax administration would offer taxpayers and their advisors
greater insights into whether their own circumstances are likely to result in
a successful request for an advance tax ruling from the IRS.269
D. CROSS-JURISDICTIONAL APPLICATION
A potential reaction to the analysis presented above is to question
whether it can be generalized to jurisdictions other than the United States.
265. See supra notes 183–197 and accompanying text.
266. See Rev. Proc. 2015-3, 2015-1 I.R.B. 129.
267. See Jay Starkman, Applying for a Private Letter Ruling, J. OF ACCT., Jan. 2010, at 21.
268. See supra notes 198–213 and accompanying text.
269. See, e.g., PWC, ISSUE 10, M&A TAX RECENT GUIDANCE 2 (Oct. 2013), http://www.pwc.com
/us/en/washington-national-tax/newsletters/mergers-and-acquisitions/assets/pwc-this-month-m-october2013.pdf (describing “much anticipated” I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 201337007 (Sept. 13, 2013)).
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Most countries do not permit public access to tax return and payment
information of specific individual and business taxpayers.270 Like the
United States, some countries, such as Japan, have experimented with
mandatory public disclosure of tax return information for limited
periods.271 Several Scandinavian jurisdictions, however, have long
maintained expansive tax transparency policies, in which significant
amounts of individual and business tax return information, as well as
administrative actions of the taxing authority, are publicly accessible.272
This Section briefly examines the public disclosure policies of one such
country, Sweden, and draws from this example several factors that suggest
when public disclosure of ex post tax information is unlikely to result in
threats to tax enforcement and compliance.
Tax Transparency in Sweden. For centuries, transparency by the
government has been a hallmark trait of the Swedish legal system. Dating
back to 1766, Swedish constitutional law provides that “every Swedish
citizen shall be entitled to have free access to official documents, in order
to encourage the free exchange of opinion and the availability of
comprehensive information.”273 The default rule provides Swedish citizens
with the right “to freely access almost all documents relating to the
administration of justice and public administration” other than certain
restricted information, such as documents that affect national security or
criminal law enforcement.274
Swedish law requires public disclosure of ex ante tax administration,

270. See generally TAX SECRECY AND TAX TRANSPARENCY: THE RELEVANCE OF
CONFIDENTIALITY IN TAX LAW (Eleonor Kristoffersson et al. eds., 2013) (describing the tax
confidentiality policies of a variety of countries).
271. For discussion, see generally Makoto Hasegawa et al., The Effect of Public Disclosure on
Reported Taxable Income: Evidence from Individuals and Corporations in Japan, 66 NAT’L TAX J. 571
(2013) (analyzing the behavioral response to the Japanese policy of public disclosure of tax returns).
272. See, e.g., 1346/1999 Laki verotustietojen julkisuudesta ja salassapidosta [Act on the Public
Disclosure and Confidentiality of Tax Information] (Fin.), translated in http://www.finlex.fi/
en/laki/kaannokset/1999/en19991346.pdf; Skattelister for inntektsåret 2015 [Tax Lists for Fiscal Year
2015], SKATTEETATEN, https://tjenester.skatteetaten.no/ (last visited Feb. 2, 2017) (Nor.); 27 ch. 6 §
OFFENTLIGHETS- OCH SEKRETESSLAG [PUBLIC ACCESS TO INFORMATION AND SECRECY ACT] (Svensk
författningssamling [SFS] 2009:400) (Swed.). For further discussion, see Erlend E. Bø, Joel Slemrod &
Thor O. Thoresen, Taxes on the Internet: Deterrence Effects of Public Disclosure, 7 AM. ECON. J.:
ECON. POL’Y 36, 36–62 (2015).
273. 2 ch. 1 § TRYCKFRIHETSFÖRORDNING [FREEDOM OF THE PRESS ACT] (Svensk
författningssamling [SFS] 1949:105) (Swed.).
274. Anna-Maria Hambre, Tax Confidentiality in Sweden and the United States – A Comparative
Study 122, 129 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
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such as advance tax rulings issued regarding specific taxpayers.275 Both the
taxpayer and the Swedish Tax Agency can request advance tax rulings
from the Council for Advance Tax Rulings regarding the tax effects of
proposed transactions.276 These advance tax rulings are published without
information that identifies the taxpayer that requested them.277
Yet unlike the United States, Sweden also mandates significant public
disclosure of information that reveals ex post tax enforcement and
decisions. Every year, the Swedish Tax Agency publishes the taxable
income and tax liability of all Swedish taxpayers, both individuals and
businesses, which are identified by name in its publicly accessible
taxeringskalender (tax calendar).278 To protect taxpayers’ personal and
proprietary information, Swedish law does not require public disclosure of
tax returns themselves, which indicate sources of income, or the tax
deductions that affect the calculation of taxable income, such as business
expenses.279 More importantly, all ex post audits and adjustments of a
taxpayer’s tax liability by the Swedish Tax Agency are publicly observable.
Swedish law requires every “decision” of the taxing authority to be open to
public inspection.280 If, for instance, the Swedish Tax Agency determines
that a taxpayer has improperly claimed a tax deduction, this decision must
be publicly disclosed.281
There are several plausible hypotheses that explain how Sweden
maintains such an expansive approach to tax transparency without
appearing to threaten its taxing authority or its standing as a country with
one of the highest tax compliance rates in the world.282
Limited Opportunity to Exploit Public Information. Swedish taxpayers

275. 27 ch. 1 § OFFENTLIGHETS (Svensk författningssamling [SFS] 2009:400) (Swed.) For further
discussion, see ROGER PERSSON OSTERMAN, FORHANDSBESKED I SKATTEFRAGOR 43 (2013).
276. See Gustaf Lindencrona, Unique Features in Swedish Tax Law, 50 SCANDINAVIAN STUD. L.
163, 166 (2007).
277. SKATTEVERKET, OFFENTLIGT ELLER HEMLIGT [PUBLIC OR SECRET] 169 (2009), as discussed
in Hambre, supra note 274, at 150.
278. See TAXERINGSKALENDERN, http://www.taxeringskalender.com/ (last visited Mar. 28, 2017).
279. See Hambre, supra note 274, at 21.
280. 27 ch. 6 § OFFENTLIGHETS- OCH SEKRETESSLAG [PUBLIC ACCESS TO INFORMATION AND
SECRECY ACT] (Svensk författningssamling [SFS] 2009:400) (Swed).
281. Id. See also Hambre, supra note 274, at 21.
282. See SWEDISH TAX AGENCY, TAXES IN SWEDEN 2012, at 39 (2012), https://www.skatteverket.
se/download/18.3684199413c956649b57c0a/1361442608341/10413.pdf (reporting tax compliance rate
of 90%).
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have a lower ability to exploit information in publicly available decisions
of the taxing authority than would be possible in the United States if
taxpayers could review complete tax return information. In contrast to the
IRS, which settles almost all tax disputes,283 the Swedish Tax Agency is
prohibited by law from entering into any settlement negotiations or special
agreements with taxpayers following an audit of the taxpayers’ returns.284
Public disclosure of these decisions, consequently, poses a lower risk of
encouraging taxpayers to pursue more aggressive tax strategies in order to
match the approaches of taxpayers who received more favorable tax
decisions from the taxing authority than others regarding the same type of
transaction. And as the Swedish Tax Agency must treat all similarly
situated taxpayers equally when reaching decisions, it does not have the
same incentive as U.S. government officials to highlight certain tax
enforcement actions over others in order to influence taxpayers’
perceptions of the consequences of tax noncompliance.
Limited Opportunity for Tax Aggressiveness. Features of Swedish tax
law create fewer opportunities for taxpayers to pursue aggressive and
abusive tax strategies, generally, than in the United States. Under the U.S.
self-assessment income tax system, individual taxpayers determine whether
to pursue actions such as: filing a tax return, reporting income that is not
subject to third-party reporting, paying self-employment taxes, paying
household employee taxes, reporting other individuals as dependents,
claiming special tax credits, among many other tax compliance acts.285
Similarly, as U.S. corporations can claim valuable tax losses and other tax
benefits that reduce their taxable income and tax liability without reducing
their earnings for financial accounting purposes, corporate tax directors
often face pressure, from shareholders and non-tax management, to pursue
tax avoidance strategies.286
Swedish taxpayers possess significantly less tax compliance
discretion. The Swedish Tax Agency provides individual taxpayers with
pre-completed income tax declaration forms, which most taxpayers simply
confirm, often by sending a text message from their smart phones.287 In
283.
284.

See Williams, supra note 146 and accompanying text.
See Eleonor Kristoffersson et al., Sweden, in TAX SECRECY AND TAX TRANSPARENCY: THE
RELEVANCE OF CONFIDENTIALITY IN TAX LAW PART 1 AND 2, at 1079, 1081–83 (Eleonor
Kristoffersson et al. eds., 2013).
285. See DEP’T OF TREASURY, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., PUBL’N. 17, TAX GUIDE 2014 FOR
INDIVIDUALS (2014), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-prior/p17--2014.pdf.
286. See supra notes 184–188 and accompanying text.
287. David Wiles, Why Swedes Are Okay with Paying Taxes, SWEDEN, https://sweden.se/society/
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addition, over 90% of Swedish individual income taxes are paid through a
non-voluntary, third-party withholding system,288 and over 30% of
Sweden’s tax revenue is attributable to a national value-added tax,289 which
is significantly more difficult to evade than an income tax. For Swedish
corporations, taxable business income is calculated using the same rules for
calculation of income for financial accounting purposes, generally accepted
accounting principles (“GAAP”).290 Uniformity of tax and financial
accounting thus lessens the incentives of tax directors to reduce taxable
income. As design of the tax system and choice of tax base limit the ability
of Swedish taxpayers to increase tax aggressiveness and engage in tax
noncompliance compared to taxpayers in the U.S., public disclosure of ex
post tax decisions of the taxing authority poses less of a threat to tax
enforcement in Sweden than in the U.S.
Public Attitudes Toward Taxation and Taxing Authority. Finally,
differences in public attitudes toward taxation and the taxing authority may
partly explain why broad public disclosure of tax information in Sweden
has not resulted in adverse tax compliance effects. By design, the U.S.
voluntary compliance system is adversarial: taxpayers complete their own
tax returns, can submit written justifications for not paying certain taxes,
and can refrain from paying tax deficiencies until receiving a decision by
the U.S. Tax Court.291 Taxpayers regularly express the sentiment best
captured by Judge Learned Hand’s famous quote, that “any one may so
arrange his affairs that his taxes shall be as low as possible . . . there is not
even a patriotic duty to increase one’s taxes.”292 A significant number of
U.S. taxpayers are also suspicious of the IRS, as recent surveys show that
the IRS is the least popular federal government institution other than
Congress.293 Public disclosure of complete tax return information would
likely embolden some taxpayers’ distrust of the IRS, as specific examples
of the agency’s weaknesses would attract significant media attention.
Public attitudes toward taxation and the taxing authority are markedly

why-swedes-are-okay-with-paying-taxes (last updated Jan. 8, 2016).
288. SWEDISH TAX AGENCY, supra note 282, at 22.
289. Id. at 25.
290. Id. at 31.
291. See supra notes 136–146 and accompanying text.
292. Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 810 (2d Cir. 1934).
293. Drew Desilver, IRS Among Least Popular Federal Agencies, PEW RES. CTR. (May 16, 2013),
http://www.pewresearch.org/daily-number/irs-among-least-popular-federal-agencies.
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different in Sweden, even as ex post decisions of the Swedish Tax Agency
are publicly accessible. In a 2015 survey, 83% of Swedish citizens reported
that they have a favorable perception of the Swedish Tax Agency.294 In
describing its citizens’ attitudes toward tax compliance, the Swedish
government reports on its official website,
Swedes are not naturally anti-tax . . . unlike in some countries where
paying tax is seen as something negative, many Swedes tolerate – and
even welcome – high taxes. In fact, the Swedish word for tax – skatt –
has another meaning: treasure. There can’t be many languages in which
the word for tax has such positive connotations.295

Many factors may explain the differing attitudes toward taxation and
the taxing authority in Sweden and the United States. Swedish citizens
enjoy substantial government benefits in exchange for their tax dollars,
such as universal healthcare, free public education, and generous retirement
benefits.296 Additionally, Sweden’s status as a unitary state, compared to
the federal system in the United States, supports citizens’ perception that
their payment of tax dollars to the national government directly funds the
government benefits they receive.297 Moreover, as the Swedish Tax
Agency is required to treat taxpayers more uniformly than the IRS, and the
Swedish tax system results in greater compliance by design,298 public
disclosure of tax information itself may even bolster positive attitudes
toward the taxing authority and the tax system.
As this discussion illustrates, public disclosure of tax payment
information and taxing authority decisions in Sweden does not appear to
provoke a reaction of increased tax aggressiveness or evasion from
taxpayers. From this case study, we can extract several attributes of a tax
system that may limit the potential for public tax return information
disclosure to impede tax enforcement: (1) low potential for disclosed tax
information to be exploited by taxpayers in establishing benchmarks of tax
aggressiveness or reverse engineering; (2) limited opportunities for
taxpayers to engage in tax avoidance or evasion, irrespective of whether tax
information is publicly disclosed; and (3) strong positive attitudes toward
taxation and the taxing authority. None of these features are apparent in the
294.
295.
296.
297.

Wiles, supra note 287.
Id.
Id.
For discussion, see PAUL LEVIN, DIR., STOCKHOLM UNIV. INST. FOR TURKISH STUDIES,
SWEDEN: INTRODUCTION TO A DECENTRALIZED UNITARY STATE (Oct. 8, 2013), http://www.tepav.org.
tr/upload/files/haber/1381998105-8.Paul_T._Levin_in_Sunumu.pdf.
298. See supra notes 284–290.
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tax system of the United States, where the taxing authority lacks the
necessary resources to audit most tax returns and does not face legal
obligations to resolve similar deficiency disputes with taxpayers on equal
terms.299
III. WHAT EX ANTE TAX ADMINISTRATION SHOULD BE
PUBLIC?
After embracing the justifications for mandatory public disclosure of
acts of ex ante tax administration, policymakers should next consider the
precise types of documents and information that should be subject to such a
policy. There are numerous possibilities. The IRS could be required to
publicly disclose any “written determination” regarding a specific
taxpayer.300 Or the policy could be limited to advance tax rulings involving
certain types of taxpayers, such as business entities and not individuals.
Release of the documents showing ex ante tax administration could also
include or exclude the taxpayers’ identities. Alternatively, public disclosure
could be mandated only when the IRS addresses a first impression issue.
In contrast to current law, which only requires the IRS to publicly
disclose instances in which it reaches an ex ante ruling regarding a specific
taxpayer,301 this Part proposes that the IRS should be required to satisfy a
new standard of openness in tax administration: “dual tax transparency.”
Under this standard, in addition to being required to release written
determinations,302 such as private letter rulings that often satisfy taxpayers’
requests,303 the IRS should also be obligated to publicly disclose
information about situations where it declines to issue such rulings or enter
into such agreements. Even if denials occur in forms other than written
determinations, such as preliminary decisions or oral communication, dual
tax transparency demands that these denials be accessible by the public.
After explaining why dual tax transparency is necessary in order to
achieve openness by the IRS regarding its ex ante legal interpretations and
review processes, this Part shows how, in many cases, current statutory law
and administrative procedures impede dual tax transparency.

299.
300.
301.
302.
303.

See Vons Companies, Inc. v. United States, 51 Fed. Cl. 1, 10 (2001).
I.R.C. § 6110(a) (2016).
See id.
I.R.C. § 6110(b)(1)(A) (2016).
See infra note 319 and accompanying text.
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A. DUAL TAX TRANSPARENCY
Dual tax transparency is critical to ensuring openness by the IRS
regarding its ex ante legal interpretations and decisionmaking processes. If
the public only observes advance rulings where the IRS agrees with the
taxpayer’s requested treatment, it will gain a limited, and possibly
distorted, understanding of the IRS’s interpretation of the tax law. An
accurate understanding is important not only for taxpayers that may be
considering submitting a request for a private letter ruling or agreement,
but also to the public that desires to hold the IRS accountable for its
actions.304 Dual tax transparency could also stimulate legislators to
consider changes to statutes that are either so complex or so unintentionally
uncertain that the IRS is unable to reach ex ante legal conclusions. And
given the high economic, even existential, value of certain types of advance
tax rulings and approvals, dual tax transparency is necessary to assure the
public that the IRS is not unreasonably discriminating against any
particular taxpayers in declining to issue such rulings and approvals.
To consider why dual tax transparency is essential to an understanding
of the IRS’s behavior in the ex ante tax administration context, consider the
following hypothetical. Imagine that a group of researchers is attempting to
identify the factors that influence high school students’ chances of gaining
college admission to Hypo University, a prestigious national research
institution.305 The researchers are specifically interested in pinpointing
features of successful “personal statements,” written essays that students
must submit to Hypo University as part of their applications. The
researchers seek to analyze the personal statements among groups of
applicants with otherwise identical characteristics, such as SAT scores,
student activities, and class rank. If the researchers only examine the
personal statements of high school students who were admitted to Hypo
University, their findings will be highly questionable. The researchers
might conclude, for instance, that personal statements that include
references to historical political figures tend to lead to admission to Hypo
University. But what about the unsuccessful personal statements? If the
researchers review these personal statements as well, they could determine,
for example, that statements that include references to favorite family pets
are less likely than statements that discuss historical political figures to

304. See supra notes 218–220 and accompanying text.
305. See also Joshua D. Blank & Nancy Staudt, Corporate Shams, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1641,
1668–69 (2012).
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correlate with admission. To identify trends, the researchers must review
the personal statements of both successful and unsuccessful applicants.
Empirical researchers consider selection bias in the collection of data
to present the risk of creating distorted conclusions.306 When a researcher
only reviews cases in which “outcome[s] of interest” have been achieved in
order to attempt to determine the independent variables that affect the
outcomes, the results are inconclusive.307 For this reason, empirical
researchers do not select data based only on the dependent variable, the
outcome.308 For example, in prior work, Nancy Staudt and I reviewed all
corporate tax abuse cases decided by the U.S. Supreme Court between
1909 and 2011 in an effort to understand the factors that result in a legal
victory for the government in these cases.309 Rather than consider only
cases where the Court agreed with the government, we reviewed all cases
where the government alleged corporate tax abuse in its briefs filed with
the Court.310 This strategy allowed us to review the entire collection of
cases in which the Court could have found abuse in order to fully
understand the outcomes.311 Without including both cases where the
outcome of interest occurred and did not occur, the conclusions of our
study, like the hypothetical study of college personal statements described
above, would have been biased.
Dual tax transparency is necessary in order to ensure that taxpayers
and policymakers do not draw biased conclusions from limited samples of
documents showing ex ante tax administration. In order to enable a
comprehensive and accurate understanding of the IRS’s behavior when
issuing advance tax rulings and approvals or entering into advance tax
agreements, a public disclosure policy should mandate disclosure of the
following types of information:
Request. The policy should require public disclosure of the initial
request for ex ante tax administration submitted by the taxpayer. In the
private letter ruling context, for instance, this document is the private letter
306. See, e.g., PETER KENNEDY, A GUIDE TO ECONOMETRICS 286–87 (5th ed. 2003); Barbara
Geddes, How the Cases You Choose Affect the Answers You Get: Selection Bias in Comparative
Politics, 2 POL. ANALYSIS 131, 131 (1990).
307. See Geddes, supra note 306, at 134.
308. See id. at 133.
309. See Blank & Staudt, supra note 305, at 1646.
310. See id. at 1645 n.14.
311. See id. at 1668.
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ruling request.312 Whether the IRS should be required to disclose the
identity of the requesting taxpayer depends on the objective of the specific
public disclosure measure. In some cases, accountability objectives may
necessitate public disclosure of the taxpayer’s identity. In other cases, the
goal of fostering public understanding of the IRS’s legal interpretations
may be possible without disclosure of the taxpayer’s identity.
Outcome. Second, the policy should mandate public disclosure of the
outcome of the taxpayer’s request. Possible outcomes are that the IRS
grants the request, the IRS denies the request, or the taxpayer withdraws
the request prior to a decision by the IRS.313
Reasoning. Last, the policy should require the IRS to explain its
analysis in reaching a decision. This information is necessary in order to
enable the public to understand the IRS’s legal interpretation of the tax law,
whether the IRS agrees or disagrees with the taxpayer’s proposed
treatment.
B. APPLICATION
While the tax law appears to require the IRS to publicly release
documents showing ex ante tax administration,314 in many cases it does not
mandate dual tax transparency, or any tax transparency at all. This Section
considers whether dual tax transparency occurs in the IRS’s public
disclosure practices regarding private letter ruling requests that taxpayers
withdraw after submission to the IRS, tax-exempt status determinations
where the IRS reaches an adverse decision, and Advance Pricing
Agreements, irrespective of whether the IRS accepts the taxpayer’s
proposed terms.
1. Withdrawn Private Letter Ruling Requests
Based on a reading of current law, one might reasonably conclude that
the IRS considers private letter ruling requests and issues rulings to specific
taxpayers openly and transparently. Not only can the public access any
private letter ruling,315 but any individual can submit a request to the IRS to
review another taxpayer’s “background file” regarding an issued private
letter ruling, which contains the taxpayer’s written private letter ruling

312.
313.
314.
315.

See supra notes 149–152 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 320–339 and accompanying text.
See I.R.C. § 6110(a) (2016).
See id.; Treas. Reg. § 301.6110-2(d) (as amended in 2012).
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request, any written material submitted by the taxpayer in support of its
request, and any written communication between the IRS and the taxpayer
regarding the request.316 The publicly available private letter ruling
information does not reveal the identity of the taxpayer that requested the
ruling or any information that could allow others to identify the taxpayer.317
Dual Tax Transparency. Current law, however, obscures from public
view most private letter rulings where the IRS concludes that it will issue
an adverse ruling to the taxpayer.
A minuscule fraction of publicly released private letter rulings contain
adverse rulings. For instance, in conducting research for this Article, I
reviewed all 1,735 private letter rulings issued and publicly released by the
IRS in 2006.318 I coded rulings as adverse where the IRS ruled the
taxpayer’s proposed transaction or actions violated a statutory or regulatory
requirement or where the IRS explicitly stated that it denied the taxpayer’s
requested treatment. I found that the IRS reached adverse determinations in
only 145 out of 1,735 (8.36%) of these rulings.319
While taxpayers predominantly seek rulings from the IRS in situations
where they have strong legal support, they also withdraw their private letter
ruling requests if they conclude that the IRS will issue an adverse ruling.320
Every taxpayer that submits a private letter ruling request to the IRS is
entitled to at least one conference of right with representatives of the IRS
Associate Chief Counsel’s office with subject matter jurisdiction over a
particular area of the tax law.321 Following this conference, the IRS will
indicate to the taxpayer if it will rule adversely and, if so, it will provide the
316. Treas. Reg. § 301.6110-2(g) (as amended in 2012).
317. See I.R.C. § 6110(c)(1) (2016).
318. To conduct this analysis, I reviewed all 1,735 private letter rulings issued and publicly
released in 2006 using the RIA Checkpoint Database and coded the rulings with the assistance of
research assistants. I coded private letter rulings as adverse where the IRS ruled the taxpayer’s proposed
transaction or actions violated a statutory or regulatory requirement, see, e.g., I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul.
200649037 (Dec. 8, 2006) (tax-exempt status revoked where earnings inured to private benefit of
individuals), or where the IRS explicitly stated that it denied the taxpayer’s requested treatment, see,
e.g., I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200604003 (Jul. 28, 2006) (taxpayer denied request to extend time to make
Section 754 election). Nearly half of the 145 adverse private letter rulings (69 out of 145) involved
revocation or denial of tax-exempt status under Section 501 of the Code. See, e.g., I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul.
200605012 (Feb. 3, 2006) (organization not operated exclusively for exempt purposes).
319. See id.
320. For the IRS’s procedures regarding withdrawal of private letter ruling requests, see Rev.
Proc. 2015-1, 2015-1 I.R.B. 35.
321. Rev. Proc. 2015-1, 2015-1 I.R.B. 55.
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taxpayer with the option to withdraw the private letter ruling request.322 In
Revenue Procedure 2015-1, the IRS’s own written policies and procedures
regarding private letter ruling requests, the IRS states:
Generally, after the conference of right is held but before the letter ruling
is issued, the branch representative will orally notify the taxpayer or the
taxpayer’s representative of the Associate office’s conclusions . . . If the
Associate office is going to rule adversely, the taxpayer will be offered
the opportunity to withdraw the letter ruling request.323

The IRS’s own written procedures explicitly permit the taxpayer to
withdraw the ruling request following oral notification of a potentially
adverse private letter ruling.324 According to current and former employees
of the IRS Office of Chief Counsel, “[a]s a practical matter, taxpayers
withdraw their requests for rulings in virtually all situations in which the
IRS indicates that an adverse ruling will be issued.”325 The ability of
taxpayers to withdraw private letter ruling requests upon learning of
potentially adverse rulings from the IRS prevents the IRS from issuing an
official written determination, the document which is required by law to be
open to public inspection.
While the IRS appears to have created procedures for public
disclosure of situations where a taxpayer has withdrawn a private letter
ruling request, significant exceptions enable the IRS to refrain from public
disclosure in most cases. If a taxpayer withdraws a private letter ruling
request, the IRS Associate Chief Counsel’s representatives who reviewed
the original ruling request may prepare a memorandum to IRS officials
with jurisdiction over the taxpayer’s tax return describing the withdrawal,
which may constitute publicly accessible Chief Counsel Advice.326
However, two significant exceptions can prevent the submission and public
disclosure of this memorandum. Under the IRS’s own procedures, the
memorandum only constitutes publicly accessible Chief Counsel Advice if
it “provides more than the fact that the request was withdrawn and that the
Associate office was tentatively adverse.”327 Additionally, the IRS
Associate Chief Counsel’s representatives will not prepare the
memorandum if the taxpayer withdraws its private letter ruling request and
322. Rev. Proc. 2015-1, 2015-1 I.R.B. 39.
323. Id.
324. Id.
325. Donald E. Osteen et al., Obtaining Private Guidance from the Internal Revenue Service, in
U.S.C. LAW SCHOOL TAX INSTITUTE 17-1, 17-19 (2002).
326. Rev. Proc. 2015-1, 2015-1 I.R.B. 35.
327. Id. (emphasis added).
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submits a written statement that its proposed transaction “has been, or is
being, abandoned.”328 Put differently, after learning of the possibility of an
adverse private letter ruling, a taxpayer can represent to the IRS that it will
not pursue the proposed transaction. In this case, the IRS will not publicly
disclose the taxpayer’s withdrawal of its ruling request.
Examination of recent private letter ruling requests by taxpayers
reveals that the IRS rarely discloses instances in which a taxpayer has
withdrawn a private letter ruling request. While this Article does not
present a comprehensive multi-year empirical study of the IRS’s private
letter ruling practice, a preliminary review of the IRS’s publicly disclosed
Chief Counsel Advice memoranda regarding withdrawn private letter
ruling requests presents striking results. During 2002–2006, the IRS
received, on average, 1,652 private letter ruling requests from taxpayers
each year.329 In this time period, the IRS issued, on average, 1,332 private
letter rulings to taxpayers.330 These figures show that the average number
of withdrawn private letter ruling requests each year was 320.331 To
conduct a preliminary review of the IRS’s public disclosure of withdrawn
private letter ruling requests, I reviewed all 534 Chief Counsel Advice
memoranda issued during the 2002–2006 period.332 I found that during this
period, the IRS publicly released 2.4 Chief Counsel Advice memoranda in
which it described a withdrawal of a private letter ruling request by a
taxpayer each year, on average.333 This amounts to 2.4 memoranda out of
320 instances, on average, in which taxpayers withdrew their private letter
ruling requests, or in 0.75% of the withdrawal cases.334 Put differently, in
over 99% of the instances where taxpayers withdrew private letter ruling
requests during the test period, the IRS did not publicly release a

328. Id.
329. Yehonatan Givati, Resolving Legal Uncertainty: The Unfulfilled Promise of Advance Tax
Rulings, 29 VA. TAX REV. 137, 150–51 n.48 (2009).
330. Id.
331. Id.
332. To conduct this analysis, I reviewed all Chief Counsel Advice (“CCA”) memoranda issued
during 2002–2006 using the RIA Checkpoint Database.
333. The number of CCA memoranda issued during 2002–2006 that address withdrawn private
letter ruling requests are as follows: 2 in 2002 (CCA 200213015; CCA 200223022); 2 in 2003 (CCA
200318026; CCA 200339047); 0 in 2004; 1 in 2005 (CCA 200515019); and 7 in 2006 (CCA
200604023; CCA 200628018; CCA 200629028; CCA 200629029; CCA 200641005; CCA 200644020;
CCA 200646001).
334. This figure is calculated by dividing 2.4 (average number of CCA memos) by 320 (average
number of withdrawn private letter rulings).
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memorandum describing the withdrawal.335
As adverse private letter rulings are nearly always obscured from
public view, dual tax transparency regarding this form of ex ante tax
administration is absent. For instance, private letter rulings regarding taxfree spin-offs almost exclusively provide taxpayers and their advisors with
examples of transactions that the IRS views as complying with the
provisions of Section 355 of the Code. It is highly unlikely that taxpayers
will observe an instance of private letter rulings where the IRS rules that a
transaction violates Section 355 of the Code, as the taxpayers that
requested rulings in such cases likely withdrew them after learning of the
IRS’s potential adverse ruling. Without dual tax transparency, taxpayers are
unable to gain a complete understanding of the IRS’s legal interpretation of
the tax law as expressed in private letter rulings. Further, Congress, acting
on behalf of the public, cannot confirm whether the IRS, as its agent, has
interpreted and applied the tax law consistently with its intent when issuing
private letter rulings. Consequently, the lack of dual tax transparency
regarding private letter rulings creates the potential for the development of
“secret tax law,” the concern that initially motivated Congress to enact
mandatory public inspection of written determinations.336
For a contrasting approach, consider the IRS’s release of revenue
rulings, which are the IRS’s official interpretations of the tax law. The IRS
issues revenue rulings as “published guidance,” meaning that, unlike
private letter rulings, all taxpayers can rely upon them.337 When the IRS
335. A possible response to this analysis is that a taxpayer could voluntarily disclose its receipt of
an adverse private letter ruling from the IRS or its own withdrawal of a private letter ruling. For
example, in 2015, when the IRS informed Yahoo Inc. that it would not issue certain private letter
rulings regarding the active trade or business requirement of tax-free spin-off transactions, Yahoo Inc.
publicly disclosed this information. See Yahoo Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Sept. 2, 2015),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1011006/000119312515314494/d35793d8k.htm (showing the
IRS declined to issue the ruling, but informed Yahoo that it “had not concluded that the proposed spinoff transaction was taxable and therefore was not ruling adversely on the request”). Voluntary
disclosure of the taxpayer, however, does not ensure dual tax transparency. Taxpayers, such as public
corporations, may not publicly disclose withdrawal of a private letter ruling request if they have not
announced the underlying transaction publicly or if the withdrawal is not a “material” event. See SEC
Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.103 (2016). Additionally, even if the taxpayer discloses the
withdrawal of a ruling request or receipt of an adverse private letter ruling, the taxpayer may not
disclose the ruling request submitted to the IRS or the reasons for the withdrawal or adverse ruling.
Last, voluntary disclosure of withdrawals or adverse private letter ruling requests are unlikely to occur
in the case of private corporations, business entities not subject to mandatory public disclosure rules, or
individuals.
336. See supra notes 218–229 and accompanying text.
337. See Rev. Proc. 89–14, 1989-1 C.B. 814; IRM 32.2.2.10 (Sept. 16, 2011).
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issues a revenue ruling, it usually includes a fact pattern that it concludes
complies with the tax law and a fact pattern that it concludes does not
comply with the tax law. For example, in Revenue Ruling 2007-42, the IRS
issued guidance that addresses whether a corporation that owns a
membership interest in a limited liability company is engaged in an “active
trade or business” under Section 355 of the Code.338 In this ruling, the IRS
provided a set of facts under “Situation 1” and a set of facts under
“Situation 2.” It concluded that the hypothetical corporation in Situation 1
was engaged in an active trade or business and that the hypothetical
corporation in Situation 2 was not so engaged.339 While the IRS appears to
appreciate the need to provide taxpayers with converse outcomes in
revenue rulings, current law does not require the IRS to meet a dual tax
transparency standard when publicly releasing private letter rulings.
Alternatives. To achieve dual tax transparency, the law should be
revised to require greater public disclosure from the IRS regarding private
letter ruling requests from taxpayers. First, every private letter ruling
request to the IRS from a taxpayer should be open to public inspection, not
just those requests where the IRS issues a written determination.340 Second,
while the IRS should continue to publicly release all private letter rulings
where it makes a written determination, it should also be required to
publicly disclose any instance in which a taxpayer withdraws a private
letter ruling request prior to the issuance of a written determination. Third,
the IRS should be required to disclose the timing of the taxpayer’s
withdrawal of the private letter ruling request, specifically noting whether
the withdrawal occurred following a conference with officials from the IRS
Associate Chief Counsel’s office that reviewed the ruling request.341 Last,
the IRS should also be required to include in the publicly accessible
background file all communication, whether written or oral, with taxpayers
regarding their private letter ruling requests, even if the taxpayers
ultimately withdraw the request.342 In each case, if policymakers desire to
protect privacy and proprietary interests, they can continue to require the
IRS to delete all identifying information from publicly released documents.
The probable objections to this alternative public disclosure policy for
338.
339.
340.
341.
342.

Rev. Rul. 2007-42, 2007-2 C.B. 44.
Id.
See I.R.C. § 6110(a) (2016).
See Rev. Proc. 2015-1, 2015-1 I.R.B. 39.
See id. at 55.
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private letter ruling requests are not persuasive. One objection is that this
approach will not result in dual tax transparency because taxpayers may
withdraw their ruling requests for reasons other than the knowledge that the
IRS will issue an adverse ruling.343 The requirement that the IRS publicly
disclose the timing of the withdrawal and the substance of any written or
oral communications would provide the public with enough information to
draw realistic conclusions about the IRS’s view of the taxpayer’s requested
tax treatment. Another objection is that this approach would restrict the
flexibility of the IRS in negotiating with taxpayers during private letter
ruling discussions. A response is that the IRS already operates under
similar disclosure rules, as all written communications regarding private
letter rulings that it ultimately issues are open to public inspection as part of
the background file.344 A credible justification for the exceptions for oral
communications and communications in situations where the IRS will issue
an adverse ruling is lacking. A final objection is that greater public
disclosure will deter taxpayers from participating in the private letter ruling
program. This concern, however, is unrealistic as a result of the high
economic value of the private letter ruling compared to the costs,345 the
conservative tax positions at issue in most private letter ruling requests, and
the continuation of the deletion of identifying characteristics.
2. Tax-Exempt Determination Letters
No form of ex ante tax administration has been the subject of as much
attention or controversy in recent years as the IRS’s approval of
organizations seeking tax-exempt status. In May 2013, the head of the IRS
Tax Exempt and Government Entities Division commented at the annual
meeting of the American Bar Association Tax Section that in reviewing
applications by organizations to receive Section 501(c)(4) tax-exempt
status as “social welfare” organizations, her division had especially
scrutinized organizations with terms such as “Tea Party” or “Patriot” in
their title (Section 501(c)(4) organizations are only permitted to engage in
limited political activities).346 Days later, a report issued by TIGTA found
that the IRS used “inappropriate criteria” based on political affiliation to
screen Section 501(c)(4) applicants, delay processing of applications, and

343.
344.
345.
346.

See id. at 39.
Treas. Reg. § 301.6110-2(g) (as amended in 2012).
See supra notes 149–152 and accompanying text.
See Stokeld, supra note 9.
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submit “unnecessary information requests” to applicants.347 Critics accused
the IRS of discriminating against organizations with conservative political
ideology,348 while defenders of the IRS responded that the IRS also
screened for terms in organization titles such as “Occupy” and “ACORN,”
terms often associated with liberal organizations.349 The resulting firestorm
caused multiple IRS officials to resign, led members of Congress to
succeed in seeking cuts to the IRS budget, and “roiled the [IRS] for
years.”350
This controversy shows that where the IRS holds the power to deliver
required approval for an organization to operate in tax-exempt form, a lack
of public disclosure can create the perception that the IRS issues these
approvals in an inconsistent, even discriminatory, manner. Surveys found
that immediately following the 2013 Section 501(c)(4) controversy, less
than a third of taxpayers reported that they trust the IRS to apply fair
enforcement of the tax law.351 Due to the statutory requirements for various
types of tax-exempt status,352 some applications lead the IRS to seek
additional information, and others fail in securing IRS approval. When
commenting on the incident, former President Barack Obama conceded
that “you want to make sure everybody is being treated fairly.”353 Dual tax
transparency, which is not required by the IRS’s current legal obligations,
would assuage such public concerns regarding tax-exempt applications.
Dual Tax Transparency. Current law requires public disclosure of
instances where organizations have successfully obtained tax-exempt status
from the IRS. When granting an organization’s request for tax-exempt
status, the IRS issues to the organization a “determination letter.”354 If an
347. TREAS. INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., supra note 8, at 3.
348. For examples, see sources cited supra note 9.
349. See, e.g., STAFF OF S. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, COMM. ON HOMELAND
SEC. & GOV’T AFFAIRS, 113TH CONG., IRS AND TIGTA MANAGEMENT FAILURES RELATED TO
501(C)(4) APPLICANTS ENGAGED IN CAMPAIGN ACTIVITY (Comm. Print 2014).
350. Jackie Calmes, Senate Report Cites I.R.S. Mismanagement in Targeting of Tea Party Groups,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 5, 2015), http://nyti.ms/1ImpJsq. See also Aprill, supra note 9, at 1162–64; Caron,
supra note 9; Thiessen, supra note 9; Wharton, supra note 9; Yin, supra note 9, at 1116.
351. Just
31%
Trust
the
IRS,
RASMUSSEN
REPS.
(Mar.
27,
2015),
http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/business/taxes/march_2015/just_31_trust_the_irs.
352. See I.R.C. §§ 501(c)(3), (4) (2016). For further discussion, see Aprill, supra note 9, at 116264.
353. The Daily Show (Comedy Central broadcast July 22, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=L88H2HWEXrw (interviewing former President Barack Obama).
354. Rev. Proc. 2015-4, 2015-1 I.R.B. 149.
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organization obtains a favorable tax-exempt determination letter, both the
IRS and the organization must make the determination letter and the
organization’s original application for exemption available for public
inspection.355 The primary rationales underlying these rules are that these
organizations benefit from public funding, donors may need to confirm that
the organization has obtained certain tax-exempt status, and public
disclosure may embolden the IRS’s efforts to ensure that these
organizations pursue activities consistently with their applications for taxexempt status.356 For these reasons, when the documents are publicly
disclosed, they bear the name of the tax-exempt organization.357
In contrast, when the IRS issues an adverse determination letter, it
publicly discloses its decision without revealing the organization’s
identity.358 The IRS is required by statute to delete the names, addresses,
and any other information that might identify the taxpayer prior to publicly
disclosing the adverse determination letter.359 An applicant that fails to
obtain tax-exempt status generally will have no reason to reveal its adverse
determination letter publicly. For instance, an organization that seeks
Section 501(c)(3) status, but that does not obtain a favorable determination
letter from the IRS as a result of its failure to satisfy statutory requirements
or for other reasons, may not seek tax-deductible contributions from
donors.360 As publicly accessible adverse tax-exempt determination letters
do not contain identifying information, the public has little-to-no ability to
conclude that a specific adverse tax-exempt determination letter replies to a
specific organization’s application.
Current law prevents dual tax transparency by mandating publicity of
the identities of organizations that obtain favorable tax-exempt
determination letters, but not of the organizations that receive unfavorable
determination letters.361 The 2013 Section 501(c)(4) controversy occurred
precisely because an oversight institution, legislators, and many members
of the public perceived that the IRS screened tax-exempt applicants based
on political affiliation of the applicant.362 Without public disclosure of the
355. I.R.C. § 6104(a)(1)(A) (2016); Treas. Reg. § 301.6104(a)-1(a) (2012).
356. For discussion, see Yin, supra note 9, at 1148–52.
357. I.R.C. § 6104(a)(1)(A) (2016).
358. See I.R.C. § 6110(a) (2016).
359. I.R.C. § 6104(c) (2016). For examples, see IRM 7.28.4-1 (Sept. 22, 2015).
360. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., PUBL’N. 557, TAX-EXEMPT STATUS FOR YOUR ORGANIZATION
(2016), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p557.pdf.
361. I.R.C. §§ 6104(a)(1)(A), 6110(a) (2016).
362. See STAFF OF S. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC.
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identity of the organizations seeking tax-exempt status, the public cannot
observe whether the IRS systematically applies different treatment to
applications for exemption depending on the organizations’ political,
religious, educational, or other characteristics. An organization that has
received an unfavorable determination letter or experienced a delay in
receiving a determination letter may also unilaterally accuse the IRS of
inappropriate discrimination in public. For instance, when Crossroads
Grassroots Policy Strategies, an organization founded by Republican
strategist Karl Rove, did not obtain a favorable determination letter from
the IRS after several years since applying, it publicly charged that the IRS
discriminates against Republican-affiliated organizations.363 Without dual
tax transparency, however, the public could not verify the claims of
organizations like Crossroads.
Alternatives. Public confidence and trust in the IRS would be
enhanced if the tax law required the IRS to publicly disclose the taxexempt applications and ultimate determination letters, whether favorable
or unfavorable, of all organizations without deleting their names and
identifying information. By identifying the recipients of both types of
determination letters, this change would enable the public to determine
whether the IRS discriminates against groups with certain political and
other characteristic affiliations. To respond to the current ability of
organizations to accuse the IRS of unduly delaying its tax-exempt
applications,364 the IRS could be required to publicly disclose the filing of
an application for tax-exempt status, including all identifying information,
at the time the IRS receives the application. This feature would enable the
public to determine whether certain types of organizations systematically
experience greater delays than others in obtaining a determination letter.
Each of these changes, which would require acts of Congress, would enable
the IRS to defend itself against accusations of bias in its review of taxexempt applications.
& GOV’T AFFAIRS, 113TH CONG., IRS AND TIGTA MANAGEMENT FAILURES RELATED TO 501(C)(4)
APPLICANTS ENGAGED IN CAMPAIGN ACTIVITY (Comm. Print 2014); Aprill, supra note 9.
363. See Paul C. Barton, Crossroads GPS Changing Skins, Watchdog Says, TAX NOTES (June 5,
2015), http://www.taxnotes.com/exempt-organizations/exempt-organizations/crossroads-gps-changingskins-watchdog-says/2015/06/05/14660846?; Richard Rubin, IRS May Be Trying to Stop Tax
Exemption of Karl Rove’s Crossroads GPS, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 30, 2015, 2:32 P.M.),
https://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2015-04-30/irs-may-be-trying-to-stop-tax-exemption-ofrove-s-crossroads-gps.
364. See Rubin, supra note 363.

2017]

THE TIMING OF TAX TRANSPARENCY

513

These proposed changes present limited threats to taxpayers’ privacy
interests. Organizations that apply to the IRS for tax-exempt status under
current law assume that, if the IRS issues a favorable determination letter,
both their application and determination letter will be publicly
accessible.365 The IRS issues a warning to taxpayers regarding public
disclosure before they submit their applications, and this warning could be
adjusted to explicitly address the possibility of public disclosure of
identifying information in the event of an adverse ruling.366 It is, thus,
difficult to argue that the potential for public disclosure of an adverse
determination would threaten an applicant’s privacy interests or discourage
them from applying for tax-exempt status.
In response to recent controversies, some have advocated for even
greater public disclosure of taxpayer-specific information in the tax-exempt
organization area. Some scholars, for instance, have argued that all taxexempt applications and determination letters and the results of all audits,
closing agreements, and other written determinations involving tax-exempt
organizations should be open to public inspection, without redaction of
taxpayers’ identities.367 Even in the tax-exempt organization area, public
disclosure of documents showing such ex post tax enforcement offers the
potential for benchmarking and reverse engineering.368 For example, as
tax-exempt organizations are currently legally required to publish their
annual tax return, IRS Form 990,369 donors and watchdog organizations,
such as the Better Business Bureau, regularly focus on “efficiency ratios”
that can be calculated using information on certain lines of this form
regarding the organizations’ expenses, including fundraising expenses.370
Empirical investigations have shown that managers of tax-exempt
organizations often engage in “opportunistic cost shifting” by overreporting expenses related to program services and under-reporting those
related to fundraising expenses to avoid generating less attractive efficiency
ratios than those of their peers.371 Public disclosure of the IRS’s closing
365. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 360, at 5.
366. Id. at 18 (“An exempt organization must also make available for public inspection without
charge its application for tax-exempt status . . . .”).
367. See, e.g., Yin, supra note 9, at 1158–59.
368. See supra notes 183–213 and accompanying text.
369. I.R.C. § 6104(b) (2016).
370. See, e.g., BBB WISE GIVING ALLIANCE, http://www.bbb.org/us/charity/ (last visited Mar. 28,
2017).
371. Ranjani Krishnan, Michelle H. Yetman & Robert J. Yetman, Financial Disclosure
Management by Nonprofit Organizations 1 (July 19, 2002) (unpublished manuscript),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=319581. See also Elizabeth K. Keating et al.,
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agreements with tax-exempt organizations could encourage influential
donors to pressure managers to pursue more aggressive fundraising
strategies, such as by participating in profit-generating ventures. And
comprehensive public disclosure of the IRS’s audit practices would enable
managers of tax-exempt organizations and third-party advisors, through
reverse engineering, to determine whether particular tax positions or
activities are likely to result in an IRS audit. By contrast, mandatory public
disclosure of tax-exempt applications and determination letters can achieve
dual tax transparency without presenting threats to the IRS’s ongoing
responsibility to monitor and possibly audit these organizations.
3. Advance Pricing Agreements
Advance Pricing Agreements are among the most economically
valuable forms of ex ante tax administration. Transfer pricing is a method
of allocating profits from a multinational corporation among the various
jurisdictions where the corporation and its subsidiaries are engaged in
business.372 Transfer pricing itself is not abusive. Yet transfer pricing
arrangements create the potential for tax abuse because they involve
transactions between related parties that may not feature market prices.373
Abuse potential is especially pronounced in situations involving unique
intellectual property that does not have an established market price.374
When U.S. corporations shift significant amounts, or even all, of their
profits to non-U.S. subsidiaries in low-tax jurisdictions, the IRS can reallocate income using the “arm’s-length standard,” where, ex post, it
attempts to replicate the prices that would be paid had the transactions
occurred between two unrelated corporations.375 In order to alleviate legal
uncertainty for taxpayers and potential litigation for the IRS, the IRS has

Misreporting Fundraising: How Do Nonprofit Organizations Account for Telemarketing Campaigns?,
83 ACCT. REV. 417, 418 (2008); Ranjani Krishnan, Michelle H. Yetman & Robert J. Yetman, Expense
Misreporting in Nonprofit Organizations, 81 ACCT. REV. 399, 400 (2006) (finding zero fundraising
expense reporting by certain tax-exempt organizations due to inappropriate reporting).
372. I.R.C. § 482 (2016); I.R.C. § 1.482-1(a)(2) (2016). For further general description, see MARC
M. LEVEY ET AL., TRANSFER PRICING RULES AND COMPLIANCE HANDBOOK ¶100 (2006).
373. For discussion, see STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 111TH CONG., PRESENT LAW AND
BACKGROUND RELATED TO POSSIBLE INCOME SHIFTING AND TRANSFER PRICING, J. DOC. NO. JCX-3710, at 56–58 (2010); Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Rise and Fall of Arm’s Length: A Study in the
Evolution of U.S. International Taxation, 15 VA. TAX REV. 89, 90 (1995); Ilan Benshalom, Rethinking
the Source of the Arm’s-Length Transfer Pricing Problem, 32 VA. TAX REV. 425, 430 (2013).
374. See STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 373, at 109.
375. I.R.C. § 482 (2016).

2017]

THE TIMING OF TAX TRANSPARENCY

515

allowed corporations to seek to enter an Advance Pricing Agreement.376
Once executed, an Advance Pricing Agreement represents a binding
written contract that ensures that for the period of the contract, which is
typically three to five years, the IRS will not challenge the corporation’s
transfer pricing structure under the arm’s length standard.377
One characterization of Advance Pricing Agreements is that they
effectively represent permission by the IRS for the largest U.S.
multinational corporations, such as Google, Apple, and Amazon, to
structure their global affairs in ways that will avoid billions of dollars of
future potential tax liability.378 The corporations that enter into Advance
Pricing Agreements are often publicly traded, meaning they are already
subject to substantial financial public disclosure obligations by non-tax
agencies.379 Despite these features, Advance Pricing Agreements are not
observable by the public.380
Dual Tax Transparency. When the IRS first instituted the Advance
Pricing Agreement program in 1991, it treated the agreements and all
background documents as “return information” protected by tax privacy.381
Following several lawsuits under the Freedom of Information Act,382 in
January 1999, the IRS conceded that Advance Pricing Agreements were, in
fact, “written determinations,” much like private letter rulings, and,
consequently, would be subject to mandatory public disclosure.383 The IRS
then informed all taxpayers who were awaiting Advance Pricing
Agreements and those who had obtained them previously that it would
soon publicly release all of the agreements in redacted form.384 Intense
lobbying on behalf of U.S. multinational corporations ensued.385 Several
376. See I.R.S. Announcement 2012-13, 2012-16 I.R.B. 805.
377. See id.
378. See, e.g., Drucker, supra note 1 (“The IRS gave its consent in a secret pact known as an
advanced pricing agreement.”).
379. See, e.g., Fast Answers: Form 10-K, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/answers/form10k.htm (last
modified June 26, 2009).
380. I.R.C. § 6103(b)(2)(C) (2016).
381. See Rev. Proc. 91-22, 1991-1 C.B. 526.
382. Bureau of Nat’l Affairs, Inc. v. Internal Revenue Serv., 24 F. Supp. 2d 90 (D.D.C. 1998)
(consolidating three separate Freedom of Information Act lawsuits: No. 1:96-CV-376, No. 1:96-CV2820, and No. 1:98-CV-1473).
383. Press Release, Internal Revenue Serv., IRS to Make Advance Pricing Agreements Public
(Jan. 11, 1999), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-news/ir-99-05.pdf.
384. See Richard C. Stark et al., Consistency, Sunshine, Privacy, Secret Law, and the APA
Program, 130 TAX NOTES 655 (2011).
385. See, e.g., Sheryl Stratton, Corporate Taxpayers Object to Disclosure of APAs, TAX NOTES
(Mar. 8, 1999), http://www.taxnotes.com/tax-notes-today/information-disclosure/corporate-taxpayers-
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months later, Congress enacted a new statute that explicitly states that
Advance Pricing Agreements and all background information related to the
agreements are confidential tax return information.386
No tax transparency, let alone dual tax transparency, regarding
Advance Pricing Agreements exists under current law.387 Since the
program was instituted, only one Advance Pricing Agreement, between the
IRS and a predecessor of pharmaceutical corporation GlaxoSmithKline, has
been made public (in that case, as a result of publicly observable
litigation).388 More importantly, even if all Advance Pricing Agreements
were subject to mandatory public disclosure, dual tax transparency would
still not occur. If the IRS is not satisfied that a corporation’s proposed
valuation of its assets is supported by economic analysis, it can exercise its
discretion to refuse to enter into an Advance Pricing Agreement.389 In order
to obtain dual tax transparency, the public would need access to all
finalized Advance Pricing Agreements and requests for Advance Pricing
Agreements where the IRS rejected the corporations’ proposed terms.
The lack of public disclosure of Advance Pricing Agreements has
generated suspicion that the IRS has facilitated U.S. and global tax
avoidance by U.S. multinational corporations. In response to recent popular
press news stories regarding the low effective U.S. tax rates of major U.S.
corporations, some have branded Advance Pricing Agreements as
“generous dealmaking,”390 where the “IRS loses revenue by cutting deals
for substantially less than would result from a transfer pricing
adjustment.”391 For example, in 2013, Lynnley Browning, an investigative
journalist, reported that Oracle, a global computer technology corporation,
reduced its U.S. tax bill by “nearly half” as a result of entering into several

object-disclosure-apas/1999/03/03/5486356?.
386. I.R.C. § 6103(b)(2)(C) (2016).
387. See id.
388. Text of 1993 SmithKline Beecham APA Available, TAX NOTES (Sept. 18, 2006),
http://www.taxnotes.com/news-documents/transfer-pricing-and-apportionment-issues/text-1993smithkline-beecham-apa-available/2006/09/18/jpv4?.
389. See I.R.S. Notice 2013-79, 2013-50 I.R.B. 653.
390. Lee A. Sheppard, Draft Senate Finance APA Report Shows Incompetent IRS, TAX NOTES
(June 27, 2005), http://www.taxnotes.com/news-documents/corporate-taxation/news-analysis-draftsenate-finance-apa-report-shows-incompetent-irs/2005/06/22/js08?.
391. Lisa M. Nadal, Who Killed the Senate APA Report?, TAX NOTES (July 22, 2013),
http://www.taxnotes.com/news-documents/transfer-pricing-and-apportionment-issues/news-analysiswho-killed-senate-apa-report/2008/01/15/jrtl?.
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Advance Pricing Agreements with the IRS.392 Browning relied on this
example to portray the agreements as “the tax break that corporate America
wants kept secret.”393 Despite the intimation of collusion between the IRS
and taxpayers, the IRS is prohibited from addressing the accusations
publicly as a result of general tax privacy rules.394 More importantly, the
public also has no ability to review details of Oracle’s Advance Pricing
Agreements, where the IRS ultimately accepted the taxpayer’s proposed
terms, or to compare them to instances where the IRS declined to enter into
Advance Pricing Agreements with other taxpayers.395
Alternatives. To preserve the sociological legitimacy of the IRS and to
enable all taxpayers to observe the IRS’s interpretations and policies in
reviewing ex ante requests for legal assurance regarding proposed transfer
pricing structures, the curtain of tax privacy on Advance Pricing
Agreements should be lifted. Under current law and policies, to seek an
Advance Pricing Agreement, a corporation must submit an application to
the IRS, allow the IRS to perform extensive due diligence, allow the IRS to
analyze the corporation’s proposed transfer pricing methodology, negotiate

392. Lynnley Browning, The Tax Break that Corporate America Wants Kept Secret, FORTUNE
(July 22, 2013), http://fortune.com/2013/07/22/the-tax-break-that-corporate-america-wants-kept-secret/.
393. Id.
394. I.R.C. § 6103 (2016).
395. Public distrust of the IRS’s participation in Advance Pricing Agreements parallels similar
concerns in other jurisdictions. For example, in 2014, journalists in Europe publicly leaked hundreds of
otherwise unobservable advance tax rulings issued by the Luxembourg taxing authority to multinational
corporations, which enabled the corporations to dramatically reduce their global tax liabilities,
including those owed to their home countries. See Luxembourg Leaks: Global Companies’ Secrets
Exposed, INT’L CONSORTIUM OF INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISTS, http://www.icij.org/project/
luxembourg-leaks (last visited Mar. 28, 2017). In 2015, European Union officials responded by
initiating deliberations over whether the advance tax rulings issued by Luxembourg and other European
Union countries should be subject to mandatory public disclosure. See, e.g., Simon Bowers,
Luxembourg Tax Files: How Junker’s Duchy Accommodated Skype and the Koch Empire, GUARDIAN
(Dec. 9, 2014), https://www.theguardian.com/business/2014/dec/09/-sp-luxembourg-tax-files-howjunckers-duchy-accommodated-skype-and-the-koch-empire. In 2016, the European Commission
concluded that, over a period of years, Ireland provided illegal state aid to Apple worth over $14 billion
by issuing two favorable advance tax rulings to the corporation. Press Release, European Comm’n,
State Aid: Ireland Gave Illegal Tax Benefits to Apple Worth up to €13 Billion (Aug. 30, 2016),
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-2923_en.htm. The European Commission has reached
similar preliminary decisions in cases involving Starbucks, Fiat, and Amazon. See U.S. DEP’T OF
TREASURY, THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S RECENT STATE AID INVESTIGATIONS OF TRANSFER
PRICING RULINGS (2016), https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/treaties/Documents/
White-Paper-State-Aid.pdf. Subsequently, the U.S. government objected, stating that the European
Commission’s approach is “inconsistent with international norms and undermines the international tax
system.” Id. at 17. For further discussion of the European Commission state aid cases, see Omri Marian,
The State Administration of International Tax Avoidance, 6 HARV. BUS. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017).
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the terms of the agreement with the IRS, and, finally, execute the
agreement.396 Congress should revise the current tax privacy and public
inspection statutes397 to mandate that the IRS publish both taxpayers’
requests for Advance Pricing Agreements and any final Advance Pricing
Agreements between the IRS and taxpayers. Similar to the prior proposals
regarding private letter rulings and tax-exempt determination letters,398
mandatory public disclosure of both requests and outcomes in the Advance
Pricing Agreement context would provide dual tax transparency.
The most significant objection to this proposal is that public disclosure
would expose sensitive proprietary information of U.S. multinational
corporations to public eyes. A response is that, prior to public disclosure,
an Advance Pricing Agreement or a request for an agreement could be
redacted to remove all proprietary information, such as trade secrets and
future business plans, as well as identifying information about the
corporation that requested the agreement.399 Advance Pricing Agreements,
thus, could be treated similarly to private letter rulings and other written
determinations under current law.400 A counter to this argument is that
Advance Pricing Agreements address a multinational corporation’s
operations in their entirety and in tremendous detail, making redaction
much more difficult than in the private letter ruling context, where the IRS
issues guidance to one taxpayer regarding a discrete legal issue.401
However, in 1999, when the IRS announced its decision to publish
Advance Pricing Agreements, it embarked on the process of redacting all
previously executed agreements, implying that publication with redaction is
possible.402 Even in redacted form, such public disclosure would alleviate
perceptions that the IRS makes “secret deals”403 when entering into
Advance Pricing Agreements.
Another potential concern is that public disclosure could interfere with

396. See KPMG, United States, in GLOBAL TRANSFER PRICING REVIEW 289, 289–93 (2015).
397. I.R.C. §§ 6103(b)(2)(C), 6110(a)(1)(A) (2016).
398. See supra Part III.B.1–2.
399. See Stark, supra note 384.
400. See I.R.C. § 6110(a)(1)(A) (2016).
401. See, e.g., Anthony Infanti et al., APA Disclosure: Can the Process Survive?, 47 CAN. TAX J.
1048, 1051 (1999).
402. See Internal Revenue Serv., supra note 383.
403. Jeremy Scott, Shedding Light on Advance Pricing Agreements, HUFFINGTON POST (July 23,
2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jeremy-scott/shedding-light-on-advance_b_3639306.html.
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the IRS’s attempts to enforce the tax law regarding transfer pricing.404 At
first glance, a publicly accessible Advance Pricing Agreement would
provide a corporate manager with information about the transfer pricing
structure of her peer corporations and would also provide insights into the
IRS’s approach to transfer pricing issues. On the other hand, a corporation
that seeks an Advance Pricing Agreement approaches the IRS affirmatively
and voluntarily provides the IRS with extensive information in order to
obtain the IRS’s ultimate approval. Because corporations voluntarily
choose to seek Advance Pricing Agreements, and in doing so, agree to
expose themselves to intense scrutiny by the IRS,405 these corporations are
not likely to be engaged in abusive transfer pricing strategies. There is a
low risk that by reviewing the Advance Pricing Agreement of a competitor,
a conservative corporate tax manager would conclude that she needs to
engage in more aggressive tax planning. In addition, Advance Pricing
Agreements, if published, would not reveal the IRS’s detection and
enforcement strategies. Rather, they would simply reveal the limits of the
IRS’s bargaining positions in Advance Pricing Agreement negotiations.
A final objection is that mandatory public disclosure could reduce
corporations’ willingness to participate in the Advance Pricing Agreement
program. Ultimately, the answer to this question could be obtained by
tracking corporations that have already decided to pursue Advance Pricing
Agreements and noting their responses after public disclosure is
implemented. In the months following the IRS’s 1999 announcement that it
would publish Advance Pricing Agreements in redacted form, the program
did not experience a significant decrease in participation from
corporations.406 One reason for this reaction is that corporate managers
may assume it is possible that, at some point, their Advance Pricing
Agreements and supporting materials could become open to public
inspection in the same manner as private letter rulings. As this sample of
taxpayer reactions shows, there is significant reason to doubt that
corporations would abandon the Advance Pricing Agreement program.407

404. See supra notes 185–192 and accompanying text.
405. For discussion, see LEVEY, supra note 372, at 127.
406. See Letter from Paul Wojcik, President, BNA, to Bill Archer, Chair, House Ways and Means
Comm. (May 12, 1999), discussed in Stark et al., supra note 384.
407. See id.
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C. ACCOUNTABILITY AND EX POST TAX ENFORCEMENT
Although this Article has argued that the IRS should be required to
publicly disclose instances of ex ante tax administration, it does not assert
that the IRS should be free to enforce the tax law ex post without
accountability to the public. Rather, policymakers should consider
alternative approaches for enhancing the accountability of the IRS
regarding its ex post tax enforcement actions that do not require public
disclosure of tax return information. This Section concludes by briefly
suggesting three such possibilities: changes to oversight, whistleblower and
data access rules, and processes.
1. Oversight
Increased congressional oversight should be explored as a potential
mechanism for improving the accountability of the IRS to the public
regarding its ex post enforcement actions. The IRS is currently required to
report to the Joint Committee on Taxation any refund payment that exceeds
a threshold amount ($2 million for individuals, $5 million for corporations)
and to allow the Joint Committee thirty days to review the report prior to
issuing the refund to the taxpayer.408 The Joint Committee on Taxation is a
nonpartisan group of ten members of Congress, each of whom is a member
of the tax writing committee of each house, with a full-time staff of tax
experts.409 By statute, the IRS is only required to notify the Joint
Committee and wait for the thirty-day period to expire.410 In practice,
however, the IRS does not issue refunds until it resolves any objections that
the Joint Committee staff raises.411 Congress enacted the refund reporting
rule in 1928 in response to suspicions that the Treasury Department,
headed by then-Secretary Andrew Mellon, had paid sizeable, unwarranted
refunds to businesses related to Mellon’s oil ventures.412 The explicit
motivation for the rule, therefore, was to increase the ability of Congress to
hold the IRS accountable for refunds.

408. I.R.C. §§ 6405(a)–(b) (2016).
409. See I.R.C. §§ 8000–05, 8021–23 (2016).
410. I.R.C. § 6405(a) (2016).
411. See IRM 4.36.2 (Sept. 22, 2015).
412. See, e.g., 68 CONG. REC. 2297 (1927) (accusing corruption regarding refunds). For further
discussion, see generally George K. Yin, James Couzens, Andrew Mellon, the ‘Greatest Tax Suit in the
History of the World,’ and Creation of the Joint Committee on Taxation and Its Staff, 66 TAX L. REV.
787 (2013).

2017]

THE TIMING OF TAX TRANSPARENCY

521

To further enhance the accountability of the IRS, the Joint Committee
review requirement could be expanded to include settlements of certain tax
deficiency disputes. Specifically, in addition to its current reporting
obligation, the IRS could be required to deliver a report to the Joint
Committee whenever it proposes to settle a tax deficiency dispute with a
specific taxpayer where the final proposed tax deficiency reflects a
reduction from the IRS’s initial asserted tax deficiency in excess of a
threshold amount ($2 million for individuals, $5 million for corporations).
For example, if the IRS initially proposes that a corporation owes an
additional $100 million in tax liability for the 2013 tax year (as noted in a
Revenue Agent Report)413 and ultimately agrees to settle the dispute for
$92 million in tax liability, the IRS would be required to file a report with
the Joint Committee on Taxation before finalizing the settlement (the $8
million difference exceeds the $5 million reporting threshold for
corporations). There is little economic difference between a refund of $2
million and a reduction in tax deficiency of $2 million, making it difficult
to justify different reporting requirements for settlements that result in a
refund of taxes, on the one hand, and a reduction in the IRS’s initial
deficiency assessment, on the other. Without requiring any public
disclosure of tax return information, this proposal would enable Congress
to exercise greater oversight by reviewing settlements where the IRS makes
significant concessions to the taxpayer.
Several likely objections to this proposed expansion should be
considered. One potential concern is that the expansion of the Joint
Committee’s role could politicize and delay the IRS’s ability to enter into
settlements.414 The same concern exists under current law, even though the
Joint Committee completes its review of the vast majority (over 75%) of
proposed refunds within 30 days and rarely questions the IRS.415 If
politicization is a concern, adjustments to both current law and the
proposed expansion could emphasize that the Joint Committee’s role is one
of review rather than approval. Another likely objection is that the IRS and
taxpayers could respond by designing settlements that avoid the reporting
requirement. Yet the same concern occurs today, where, for instance, a

413. See IRM 4.10.8.3 (Sept. 12, 2014).
414. Cf. Michael J. Graetz, Paint-By-Numbers Tax Lawmaking, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 609, 615
(1995).
415. See Meg Shreve, Barthold Suggests Raising C Corporation Refund Review Level to $5
Million, TAX NOTES (Apr. 10, 2013), http://www.taxnotes.com/tax-notes-today/corporate-taxation/
barthold-suggests-raising-c-corporation-refund-review-level-5-million/2013/04/10/f1tn?.
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taxpayer can avoid Joint Committee reporting by offsetting a refund (such
as one due to a net operating loss)416 with a tax deficiency for the same
year.417 A final objection is that the proposed expansion raises
constitutional separation-of-powers concerns. Several commentators have
raised this objection in response to the current reporting requirement
regarding refund payments by arguing that current law empowers the Joint
Committee (the legislative branch) to engage directly in a function of the
IRS (the executive branch) by reviewing proposed refund payments.418 One
response is that the current statute419 and the proposed expansion could be
adjusted to explicitly state that the IRS is not obligated to seek approval
from the Joint Committee during the thirty-day review period. Another
possibility is that the proposal could be adjusted to simply require the IRS
to inform the Joint Committee of the settlements described above within 30
days after they have been finalized, rather than while they are still pending.
In any case, the constitutional objections and potential remedies should
apply equally to current law regarding refunds and to the proposed
expansion to tax deficiency settlements.
2. Whistleblowers
An additional accountability measure could be to encourage
employees of the IRS to file whistleblower reports not just with internal
review bodies, but with external review bodies as well. The IRS repeatedly
instructs its employees to report malfeasance by IRS managers and other
employees to TIGTA.420 Several commentators have suggested that fear of
retaliation has dissuaded some IRS employees from filing whistleblower
claims with TIGTA.421 Under current law, if an IRS employee commits a

416. I.R.C. § 6405(b) (2016).
417. For discussion, see Thomas J. Callahan et al., Joint Committee Refund Review: Twelve
Questions to Consider, 10 J. OF TAX PRAC. & PROC. 19, 20 (2008).
418. Amandeep S. Grewal, The Congressional Revenue Service, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 693, 700–
18. See also JASPER L. CUMMINGS JR., THE SUPREME COURT, FEDERAL TAXATION, AND THE
CONSTITUTION 590 (2013).
419. I.R.C. § 6405(a) (2016).
420. See, e.g., IRM 13.1.15.3 (Jan. 6, 2009); Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform
Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-206, §1203, 112 Stat. 685, 720–22 (1998).
421. See, e.g., Amy Hamilton, Newspapers Link “10 Deadly Sins” to IRS Enforcement Figures
Drop, 83 TAX NOTES 1119 (1999); Ann Murphy & David Higer, The 10 Deadly Sins: A Law With
Unintended Consequences, 96 TAX NOTES 871 (2002); Warren Rojas, Agent Says IRS Used Disclosure,
Circular Referrals to Block Audit, TAX ANALYSTS (Aug. 10, 2004), http://www.taxanalysts.com/www/
freefiles.nsf/Files/Whistle-Blower.pdf/$file/Whistle-Blower.pdf .
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“Section 1203” violation,422 otherwise known as one of the “Ten Deadly
Sins,”423 such as willfully failing to file his own tax return correctly and on
time, the employee can be terminated. As one IRS employee has
commented when addressing this possibility, “It’s real easy to make a small
mistake on a return, even for someone who knows taxes. So that gives [IRS
managers] a real instrument of terror, so to speak.”424 Whether or not this
specific allegation is supported and can be generalized, the comment
highlights the possibility that some IRS employees refrain from reporting
abuse to an internal review body, such as TIGTA.
To enhance its ability to monitor potential abuses, Congress could
revise current law to encourage IRS whistleblowers to file reports with
certain external review bodies in Congress. In 1998, Congress enacted an
amendment to the tax privacy statute that provides that any person with
access to confidential tax return information, such as an IRS employee,
who believes that the information relates to “misconduct,
maladministration or taxpayer abuse” may disclose this information to the
House Ways and Means Committee, the Senate Finance Committee, or the
Joint Committee on Taxation.425 Yet IRS employees have received little
notice of this provision in IRS official communications (the Internal
Revenue Manual contains only one reference, compared to 47 references to
Section 1203 violations and TIGTA reporting procedures).426
Congress could strengthen this statute by enacting several
adjustments. Congress could clarify the specific types of potential abuses
that should be reported. Specific acts by IRS officials could include:
unjustified deviations from established audit procedures (such as by
entering into a closing agreement prematurely);427 consideration of
inappropriate factors in reaching audit or settlement decisions (such as
political affiliation or personal relationships with the taxpayer);428 and
failure to follow clearly established law and procedures (such as imposition
of certain tax penalties).429 Even though other legal protections may be
422. Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-206,
§1203, 112 Stat. 685, 720–22 (1998).
423. Leandra Lederman, Tax Compliance and the Reformed IRS, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 971, 981
(2003).
424. Rojas, supra note 421, at 8 (quoting Bill Henck, Senior Attorney, IRS LMSB).
425. I.R.C. § 6103(f)(5) (2016); H.R. REP. NO. 105-599, at 98 (1998) (Conf. Rep.).
426. See IRM 11.3.4.3(5) (May 20, 2005).
427. See, e.g., Rojas, supra note 421, at 3.
428. See supra notes 346–353.
429. See, e.g., Rojas, supra note 421, at 5.
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available to IRS employees,430 Congress could affirmatively clarify within
this statute that IRS employees may not be subject to retaliation or
punishment for providing information to the authorized congressional
committees. Finally, Congress could explicitly direct the IRS to publicize
this statute to its employees in numerous media.
Elevation of the congressional whistleblowing process raises several
potential concerns, such as that it could increase politicization of tax
administration, threaten taxpayer confidentiality, and fail to result in review
that is as comprehensive as that of TIGTA. Rather than politicization,
however, greater emphasis on congressional whistleblowing could enhance
the public’s perception that the IRS cannot engage in maladministration of
the tax law without answering to the public’s representative, Congress.
Further, the authorized congressional committees have the power to request
tax return information from the IRS and hold hearings under current law.431
Prevention of violations of taxpayer privacy should be addressed in both
current law and any expansion of the congressional whistleblowing statute.
Last, congressional whistleblowing should not supersede or replace the role
of TIGTA. IRS whistleblowers could file reports with this office and with
the authorized congressional committees simultaneously. Alternatively, in
the event that a whistleblower files a complaint with an authorized
congressional committee exclusively, that committee would retain the
ability to request TIGTA to conduct further investigation of the alleged
abuse.
3. Data
Finally, increased public disclosure by the IRS of anonymous tax data
and greater access to this data by academic researchers would advance tax
transparency without requiring public disclosure of specific taxpayers’ tax
return information. Every year, the IRS publishes data that shows audit
rates for individuals and businesses within different income brackets and
describes, in aggregate dollars, the amount of civil tax penalties assessed
and abated for various types of tax offenses, among many other items.432

430. For discussion, see, e.g., U.S. OFFICE OF SPECIAL COUNSEL, KNOW YOUR RIGHTS WHEN
REPORTING WRONGS (2015), https://osc.gov/Resources/Know%20Your%20Rights%20When%20
Reporting%20Wrongs.pdf.
431. See I.R.C. § 6103(f) (2016).
432. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 138. For statutory requirement, see I.R.C. § 6108(a)
(2016).

2017]

THE TIMING OF TAX TRANSPARENCY

525

The IRS publishes only macro data without any information that could
identify any taxpayer. The 2014 IRS Data Book states, for instance, that, in
2014, the IRS audited 271,574 income tax returns for individuals with
income under $200,000 and conducted 37,501 field audits and 234,073
correspondence audits.433 Despite the publication of this information,
critics and academic researchers report that it does not allow for
sophisticated analysis given its macro form. As Emmanuel Saez,434 Raj
Chetty,435 and others436 have written, access to micro data, involving
detailed information often revealed on tax returns, “is critical for cuttingedge empirical research.”437
Without revealing enough detailed tax return information to enable
analysts to reverse engineer the IRS’s audit and related enforcement
strategies, the IRS could increase the specificity of its published aggregate
tax enforcement statistics. Consider several examples from the 2014 IRS
Data Book. While the IRS reports that it assessed $1,072,236,000 in
“accuracy penalties,”438 it could distill this figure into the multiple tax
penalties that the IRS concedes fall into this broad category, such as tax
penalties for negligence, substantial understatement of income tax,
substantial valuation misstatements, substantial overstatement of pension
liabilities, and understatement of reportable transactions, among others.439
The IRS also notes that it abated $417,858,000 of assessed accuracy tax
penalties,440 but it explains that it abated them for numerous reasons
including IRS error, reasonable cause, and “administrative and collection
costs not warranting collection of penalty.”441 Instead, the IRS could
describe the specific amounts of tax penalty abatement attributable to each
of these reasons. As another example, the IRS reports that it collected

433. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 138, at 23 tbl.9a.
434. EMMANUEL SAEZ ET AL., EXPANDING ACCESS TO ADMINISTRATIVE DATA FOR RESEARCH IN
THE UNITED STATES (2010).
435. Shamik Trivedi, Increased Microdata Accessibility Will Aid Policymakers, 134 TAX NOTES
931 (2012) (quoting Raj Chetty).
436. See, e.g., Am. Econ. Ass’n, Report on the State of Publicly Available Data and Statistics For
the Study of Public Economics (Dec. 15, 2005) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
437. SAEZ ET AL., supra note 434, at 1. Members of the American Economic Association have
reported that the “tax model,” a stratified random sample of anonymized tax returns released by the
IRS, prevents them from linking tax return data to demographic factors. Am. Econ. Ass’n, supra note
436, at 3.
438. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 138, at 44 tbl.17.
439. Id. at 44 tbl.17, n.4.
440. Id. at 44 tbl.17.
441. Id. at 44 tbl.17, n.2.
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$1,905,254,000 in taxes attributable to delinquent tax returns.442 In more
refined data reporting, it could disclose the extent to which this amount is
attributable to delinquencies of different time periods, such as more than
one year or more than five years. These are just a few of many examples of
refinements to the IRS’s current anonymous data reporting practices that
could enhance the IRS’s openness to policymakers and the public.
Additionally, with increased funding, the IRS could improve access to
anonymous micro tax data by academic researchers. The IRS currently
allows a small number of academic researchers to analyze this information
in anonymized form, and only on the premises of secure IRS facilities.443
The IRS Statistics of Income Division annually selects several research
proposals that require access to tax return data and allows IRS officials to
work directly with academic researchers on these analyses.444 IRS officials
and researchers alike report that the IRS simply lacks “sufficient resources
and bandwidth to accommodate many simultaneous research projects.”445
Congress could foster such sophisticated analysis by increasing funding for
collaborative research projects between IRS officials and academic
researchers. Another possibility for increasing such collaborations,
suggested by Alan Kreuger and others,446 is that the home research
institutions of the academic researchers seeking access to tax return
information could bear a significant portion of the associated costs (similar
to research arrangements involving the U.S. Census Bureau).447
While increased public and academic access to anonymous tax return
information presents genuine concerns, these concerns are not
insurmountable.
In response to taxpayer confidentiality concerns, the public disclosure
of such data in aggregate form would prevent others from deciphering
specific taxpayers’ identities. Also, if more academic researchers gain
access to anonymized tax return data, they would be subject to the same

442. Id. at 43 tbl.16.
443. For discussion, see Trivedi, supra note 435.
444. See Statistics of Income – Joint Statistical Research Program, IRS, http://www.irs.gov/pub/
irs-soi/14jsrpapplication.pdf (last visited Mar. 28, 2017).
445. SAEZ ET AL., supra note 434, at 3.
446. See Jeffrey Mervis, How Two Economists Got Direct Access to IRS Tax Records, SCIENCE
(May 22, 2014), http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2014/05/how-two-economists-got-direct-access-irstax-records (quoting Alan Krueger).
447. See id.
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statutory tax privacy rules as IRS employees,448 and the IRS would retain
the ability to review final research projects to ensure that taxpayer
confidentiality is preserved.
Another potential concern is that increased access to tax return
information, even in anonymous form, would increase the risk that analysts
may reverse engineer the IRS’s enforcement strategies, potentially
weakening tax compliance. The tax enforcement dangers discussed
previously in this Article449 would materialize if the IRS were to publicly
disclose micro tax data, such as complete tax returns, the results of tax
audits, and the filing of reportable transaction disclosures by taxpayers. If
the IRS only increases the specificity of publicly disclosed aggregate data,
such as the aggregate dollar amount of certain tax penalties assessed in a
particular year, this information would not enable taxpayers and analysts to
determine, using either statistical or qualitative methods, the reasons why
the IRS applied these tax penalties in specific cases. The IRS could also use
currently available legal mechanisms to review academic researchers’ final
analysis involving micro tax data and could prevent public dissemination of
any analysis that would reveal the IRS’s approach to selecting tax returns
for audit or its other tax enforcement strategies.450
Increased public disclosure of anonymous aggregate tax data and
academic access to anonymous tax return data, thus, could further the
public’s “understanding of the important functions of the IRS”451 without
threatening the IRS’s tax enforcement efforts.
CONCLUSION
Proponents of greater tax transparency frequently suggest sunlight in
the form of public disclosure of tax return information as a means of
enabling the public to review the actions of the IRS. By considering the
timing of the actions of the IRS that mandatory public disclosure would
expose, this Article has made three unique contributions to perennial
debates regarding tax privacy and tax transparency.
First, the Article has argued that ex ante tax administration actions
present more compelling justifications for public disclosure than ex post
tax enforcement actions. By retaining existing tax privacy rules for certain
448.
449.
450.
451.

I.R.C. § 6103(j)(4) (2016).
See supra Part II.B.
I.R.C. § 6103(b) (2016).
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 138, at iii.
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tax return documentation, such as complete tax returns of individuals and
corporations, policymakers would avoid several adverse tax enforcement
and compliance effects. Yet by ensuring broad public access to the IRS’s
advance tax rulings, advance tax agreements, and approvals regarding
specific taxpayers, policymakers would enhance the accountability of the
IRS to the public without interfering with the agency’s ability to deter and
detect avoidance and abuse.
Second, the Article has proposed that when requiring public disclosure
of ex ante tax administration, policymakers should strive to achieve “dual
tax transparency,” where the public has access to instances where the IRS
grants and denies taxpayers’ requests for advance tax rulings or
agreements, even without an official written determination. It has provided
several examples of ex ante tax administration where current law impedes
dual tax transparency—withdrawn private letter ruling requests, adverse
tax-exempt determination letters, and Advance Pricing Agreements—and
has suggested specific public disclosure reforms.
Last, this Article has proposed legal mechanisms other than public
disclosure that would enhance the accountability of the IRS regarding its ex
post enforcement. Possibilities include increasing oversight of certain IRS
settlements by Joint Committee on Taxation, encouraging IRS
whistleblowers to file reports with authorized congressional committees,
and expanding public and academic access to anonymous tax data.
By considering significant distinctions between different types of
actions of the IRS, this Article has argued that some actions should occur in
sunlight while others should remain in the shade. This analysis should have
important implications for legislators, scholars, and taxpayers who seek to
empower the public to monitor whether the IRS is enforcing the tax law
fairly, efficiently, and effectively.

